What is Wrong with Character Evidence? by Tillers, Peter
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 49 | Issue 3 Article 10
1-1998
What is Wrong with Character Evidence?
Peter Tillers
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 Hastings L.J. 781 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol49/iss3/10
What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?
by
PETER TILLERS*
Introduction: Rethinking the Riddle of the Character Evidence
Rule
The rule barring the use of character to show conduct-the
"character evidence rule"-has undergone significant erosion in
recent years. The rule also has been subjected to withering criticism.
But the character evidence rule-which bars the "circumstantial" use
of character-is not yet dead. Moreover, the character evidence rule
still has many defenders. (Indeed, in the legal community the rule's
defenders seem to outnumber its critics.)
What is the future of the character evidence rule?
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the standard
explanations and justifications for the character evidence rule are
inadequate. This suggests that the character evidence rule may
become a dodo. But it is premature either to celebrate or mourn the
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
This essay is dedicated to Jesse Glendon Tillers and Lily Glendon Tillers.
My thanks go to Judge Jack Weinstein, Alex Stein, Craig Callen, Mary Ann
Glendon, Miguel Mendez, Roger Park, and David Schum for their comments. I am
particularly indebted to Miguel Mendez for calling my attention to the affinity between
portions of my argument and the arguments of some personality theorists. I am also
deeply indebted to Roger Park. He and I have exchanged sporadic e-mail messages
during the past several years about the topic of character evidence. Even an inattentive
reader will notice that many of the positions I take are similar to the positions that Roger
Park has taken both in print and in conversation. His influence on my views about the
character evidence rule has been, I believe, profound. I know of no adequate way to
acknowledge the extent of that influence except in a note such as this. (I hasten to add
that any errors in this paper really are my own. He provided the inspiration. It was my
job to supply the perspiration.)
Although I have never met or spoken with Susan Marlene Davies, I would also like
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this paper. Although my own arguments do not rest on personality theory or empirical
research in the social sciences, her excellent paper has relieved me, I believe, of the
obligation to demonstrate that social science research is not incompatible with the
positions I have taken in this paper. For that I am immensely grateful.
Finally, I am particularly grateful to Judge Weinstein for his comments, including his
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[781]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
death of the character evidence rule. One prominent observer, John
Langbein, takes the position that rules of evidence are particularly
hardy weeds that manage to survive even when there is no good
reason for their continued existence. I But even if one's view of the
law of evidence is not as caustic as Langbein's, it may be too soon to
dance on the grave of the character evidence rule: even if good
reasons for the character evidence rule are not apparent, such
reasons may exist. Hence, this essay does not attempt either to
defend the character evidence rule or to demolish it. It is, instead, an
effort to "rethink"2 the character evidence rule and the possible
reasons for its existence.
In Part I of this essay, I explain why several common
explanations for the character evidence rule do not work. In Part II.
I consider the possibility that circumstantial character evidence is
incompatible with the idea or ideal of human autonomy. After
rejecting this possibility (but drawing some inspiration from it), I
explain in Part III why it is incorrect to say that evidence of human
character is generally inadmissible to show human conduct. Part IV
of this paper develops my thesis that the conception of character as a
bundle of traits is inadequate and that it is far better to think of
character as the "animating spirit" or the "internal operating system"
of a human organism. In the conclusion to this paper, I make some
general observations about the character evidence rule.
In this paper, I take no position on the question of whether the
character evidence rule is, on the whole, a good thing or a bad thing.
1. See John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3, 19-20 (1978). See also John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers.
45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 300-06 (1978).
2. Although I do wish to recast or "reformulate" the problem of the character
evidence rule, I do not claim that the ideas in this paper are revolutionary or even
particularly original. Most of the ideas that enter our minds-particularly ideas about
matters such as law and morals-have been thought many times before. See Mary Ann
Glendon, Tradition and Creativity in Culture and Law, in FIRST THINGS 13 (Nov. 1992):
JOHN HAUGELAND, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 12 (1985)
("[I]nvention is often just a rearrangement (more or less dramatic) of previously available
materials.").
I wish to emphasize that in calling for a reformulation of the character evidence rule
riddle, I am not saying or intimating that there has been no fresh or important thinking
about the character evidence rule in recent years. To the contrary, there has been a
considerable amount. See Craig R. Callen, Proving the Case: Character and Prior Acts:
Simpson, Fuhrman, Grice, and Character Evidence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 777 (1996).
"Fresh thinking"-new theoretical speculation-is not the only thing we need. We also
need, for example, careful empirical investigation., which requires imagination as well as
diligence. Recent years have seen many valuable empirical studies have been done of
various types of evidence. See Peter Miene, Roger C. Park, & Eugene Borgida. Juror
Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992)
(evaluating juror use of hearsay evidence).
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Instead, I describe some of the questions that need to be addressed
before any radical surgery is performed on the character evidence
rule. These questions surface if one conceives of character, not as a
bundle of traits, but as the internal operating system, or animating
spirit, of the human organism. The general theme of my essay is that
a true understanding of the character evidence rule is impossible
without a true understanding of the character of human character.
I. Character Evidence and the Usual Suspects: Irrelevance and
Undue Prejudice
A. Character Evidence and the Principle of Relevance
A surprisingly common explanation for the character evidence
rule is that the probative value of most character evidence is meager,
practically non-existent, or vanishingly small.' This is an inadequate
explanation or justification for the character evidence rule.
(1) The Question of the "Logical Relevance" of Character Evidence
Although the "meager probative force" theory is an inadequate
rationale for the character evidence rule, the explanation for the
inadequacy of this rationale cannot be grounded in contemporary
legal definitions of "relevance." Modern definitions of "relevance"
such as the one given by Federal Evidence Rule 401 are extremely
expansive. They generally provide that evidence is relevant if it has
any probative force at all, regardless of how little. Practically all
character evidence, when measured against this enormously liberal
standard, is "relevant."4 However, though this fact-the almost
indubitable fact of the "relevance" of character evidence-may
reveal a great deal about definitions of relevance such as those found
in Federal Evidence Rule 401, it tells us little or nothing about the
merits or demerits of the claim that character evidence is made
inadmissible because of its meager probative value. For even if we
3. This thesis is theoretically distinct from the argument that jurors or triers of fact
tend to overestimate the probative value of character evidence. The alleged tendency of
jurors or triers of fact to overvalue character evidence may occur even if it is supposed
that character evidence has more than minimal probative value. See infra note 24.
Nonetheless, most of the observers who express a concern about the overestimation of
character evidence seem to be primarily worried about the exaggeration of the
significance of evidence that they think has either very little or no probative value.
4. There is almost universal agreement about the general proposition that character
evidence is "relevant" under liberal modem definitions of relevance. See Harris v. State,
567 A.2d 476, 482-84 (Md. App. 1989) (explaining that even inadmissible evidence may
be relevant), rev'd on other grounds, 597 A.2d 956 (Md. 1991).
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conclude that character evidence is, "technically speaking," relevant,
we are free to conclude that character evidence generally or always
has a meager amount of probative force.5 The fact of the "relevance"
of practically all character evidence speaks principally to the serious
limitations of the much-vaunted "modern" theory of "logical
relevance."6
(2) The Question of the "Legal Relevance" of Character Evidence
"The fact is that the average person is able to explain, and even
predict, the behavior of persons with a facility and success that is
remarkable."7
The true thrust of the "meager probative force" rationale is not
that character evidence is "logically irrelevant," but that the
probative forces of character evidence is too meager to justify the
costs associated with its admission. An earlier generation of scholars
and legal professionals might well have said that character evidence is
or ought to be inadmissible because it does not meet the standard of
"legal relevance"-that it ought to be inadmissible because it does
5. The modern definition of relevance is so expansive that it can be difficult to
imagine evidence that is truly irrelevant. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 9 n. 1. at 657-
58 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983) ("This expansive understanding of what it is that makes
evidence 'relevant' makes it quite difficult to assert with any confidence that any evidence
is irrelevant to anything" and careful analysis of "decisions that purport to exclude
evidence for its irrelevancy usually serves to demonstrate that the supposedly irrelevant
evidence was in fact excluded (or should have been) for reasons quite apart from
irrelevance, such as undue prejudice or undue consumption of time."). The relevance of
practically all evidence principally goes to show that bare, literal "relevance" is not
sufficient to make evidence even presumptively admissible. As I said in 1983 about the
relationship between rules such as Federal Evidence Rule 401 and Federal Evidence Rule
403, "[W]hat the Lord Giveth, the Lord Taketh." 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 28, at
975 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983). See also CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK.
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 9 (2d ed., 1996) (using
practically identical Biblical phraseology to describe the effect of the interaction of Rues
401 and 403). That is to say: Rules 401 and 403, when taken in combination, effectively
require that admissible evidence have more than some barely perceptible amount of
probative force.
6. See generally 1A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 37.1, at 1005-06, § 37.4, at 1030-42.
The difficulties with the "logical relevance" standard are discussed in considerable detail
at various points in my revision of Wigmore's treatise. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 5. § 9
n. 1, at 657-58, 663-664: 1A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 28 n.1, at 968-969; id. § 37.2, at
1019-1025; id. § 37.4, at 1030-33: id. § 37.7, at 1089-95. (My analysis suggests that logic
alone does not explain the emergence of the "logical relevance" notion; other factors-
for example, perhaps the desire of legal professionals to give the appearance of
preserving juror fact-finding prerogatives while in fact maintaining a system of extensive
judicial control over juror fact-finding-were at work.)
7. PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,
in A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 1, 2 (1989).
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not have more than the "bare minimum" of probative force that is
required for admissibility.
There is one obvious but grave difficulty with this version of the
"meager probative force" rationale for a prohibition against
circumstantial character evidence:
A considerable amount of character evidence has a substantial
amount of probative value.'
B. Undue Prejudice as a Result of "Sentiment"
The rule authorizing the exclusion of character evidence is
sometimes rationalized as a special case of the general principle of
"undue prejudice"-the principle that evidence, including relevant
evidence, may be excluded as unduly "prejudicial." One species of
the undue prejudice notion focuses on the risk of "misdecision" that
can be created by matters such as "sentiment," "emotion," and
"passion." This species of the prejudice principle has two distinct
variants. The first variant focuses on the risk that jurors'9 emotions
and passions will produce misdecision because of the tendency of
emotion and its cousins to overwhelm or disable ordinary reason and
judgment. The second variant emphasizes the risk that the personal
sentiments of jurors-such as personal dislikes and hatreds-will
induce them to refuse to do what the law requires them to do with
the evidence that they have been given.
8. It may not matter-it probably does not matter-whether it is true that a
"considerable" amount of character evidence has substantial probative value. Perhaps all
that matters is that it is sometimes the case that character evidence has substantial
probative value. This is arguably all that matters if trial courts have the ability to
distinguish character evidence with an insignificant amount of probative value from
character evidence with a substantial amount of probative value. If the administrative
costs associated with making this distinction are not substantial and if trial judges can be
trusted to make this sort of distinction consistently and fairly, the relative proportion of
character evidence that does and does not have significant probative value is immaterial.
It should be noted, of course, that rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403 give trial
judges the job of making judgments about the magnitude of the probative value of
particular items of evidence (as well as about the magnitude of various kinds of risks and
costs that are associated with particular items of evidence). Hence, given Rule 403, one
cannot easily defend a categorical rule solely on the ground that it (allegedly) removes
the trial judge's capacity to make "subjective" judgments about the probative value of
evidence.
9. This section of the paper refers only to jurors. It is possible, however, that the
undue prejudice principle-or at least some versions that principle-should apply in
bench trials as well as in jury trials. See infra pp. 9-11. See also 1 WIGMORE, supra note 5,
§ 4d.1, at 221-28 (suggesting, inter alia, that exclusion of evidence for reasons such as
undue consumption of time is appropriate in bench trials as well as in jury trials).
Mar. 1998] CHARACTER EVIDENCE
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(1) The Sentiment That Overwhelms, Corrodes, and Disables Reason:
Sentiment as Brute Emotion or Passion
One difficulty with the power-of-brute-emotion justification for
the character evidence rule is that a considerable portion of
inadmissible character evidence is unlikely to arouse swells of
emotion that are strong or durable enough to impair significantly the
ability of triers of fact to remember and reason about evidence by the
time they retire to the jury room to deliberate; jurors generally have
enough time to let their "brute" emotions subside before they must
begin their deliberations.
A second difficulty is that much evidence that would be
inadmissible character evidence if it were offered solely to show
conduct in conformity with character is not barred by the character
evidence rule if it is offered for another purpose. For example,
evidence of a prior safecracking, though not admissible to show the
defendant's propensity to break into safes and steal money, may be
admissible to show that the defendant had the ability to crack the
safe that he is now on trial for having cracked and looted. If the
tendency of evidence of character to cloud reason with emotion were
the true reason for the character evidence rule, evidence revelatory
of character would be inadmissible regardless of the purpose for
which it is offered.
A third difficulty is that the American character evidence rule
ostensibly applies in bench trials as well as in jury trials."°
The fourth difficulty is that it is rather unclear what a brute
emotion is. It is not completely obvious that the emotions ordinarily
provoked by courtroom evidence (as opposed to those provoked by a
matter such as a physical attack) can reasonably be characterized as
"brute emotions," nor is it beyond doubt that the kinds of emotions
that character evidence ordinarily evokes always or generally impede
inferential performance. (It is even possible that "inflammatory"
character evidence generally improves inferential performance-
because such emotion-arousing evidence, by definition, tends to
engage the attention of the trier or triers of fact.)
(2) The Sentiment that Subverts and Nullifies the Authority of Legal Reason
and Rules: Sentiment as Personal Preference
The claim that the sentiment or feeling occasioned by character
evidence has the capacity to lead a jury into error sometimes
10. See infra at 789.
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amounts to the claim that character evidence may lead jurors to
decide to resolve the dispute on the basis of their personal
preferences-their "personal sentiments"-instead of on the basis of
the authoritative legal rules and principles that they have been told
that they are required to follow. The concern in this situation is that
character evidence will induce the jurors to concentrate on their own
preferences, sentiments, or feelings and that the jurors'
preoccupation with their own preferences may lead the jurors to
decide-perhaps quite calmly and without any throbbing passion or
emotion-to give effect to their own "personal" preferences rather
than to the law's mandates and requirements. The danger is that
jurors will deliberately decide to do what they have been told not
do.
11
The second variant of the sentiment-based rationale involves, in
short, the alleged problem of "jury nullification." If it is at all
appropriate to speak of juror passion or sentiment when there is juror
misuse of evidence and facts because of juror or jury nullification, the
kind of passion or sentiment involved may very well be a "bloodless"
or "dispassionate" kind. This is because, by hypothesis, the reason
for the jury's misdecision in such a situation is not rooted in the cloud
that emotion throws over reason. The theory here is, in effect, that
the jury decides or chooses to make improper use of the evidence
before it.
That is the theory.
Does it hold water?
No.
There are two or three principal reasons for saying that the risk
of jury nullification does not explain the character evidence rule.
First, the character evidence rule is thought to apply in bench trials as
well as in jury trials. 2 Second, one might question the assumption
that jurors are more prone than judges to engage in "nullification.
' 13
11. This theory of the prejudicial nature of character evidence does not depend on
the supposition that character evidence has the capacity to impair the ability of jurors to
reason and deliberate about evidence and facts. This theory instead rests on the premise
that character evidence inclines jurors to use the wrong reason and the wrong set of
preferences; this theory asserts that character evidence will lead jurors to substitute their
preferences for the law's "preferences"-not because jurors who are confronted with
character evidence cannot reason in a competent fashion about evidence, but, rather,
because jurors who are confronted with character evidence are likely to believe that their
personal preferences are better than the law's preferences and are likely to give effect to
their own preference rather than the law's supposedly mandatory and authoritative
preferences.
12. See infra p. 9 and the discussion supra note 9.
13. It is generally thought that judicial nullification is rare. However, it is not
unknown. See Jan Hoffman, Judge Acquits Abortion Protesters on Basis of Religious
Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, at 25; A Ruling Too Far, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 3. 1997, at
Mar. 1998]
The third alleged infirmity of the nullification rationale is the
most cogent: despite the existence of the character evidence rule,
much evidence revelatory of character is considered admissible and is
often admitted if it is offered to show matters such as "intent,"
"opportunity," and other matters apart from "conduct in conformity
with character." Were it really the case that evidence revelatory of
character tends to make a jury ignore the law's preferences and
substitute its own, this risk or tendency would exist when such
evidence is admitted even for a "limited" and "non-character"
purpose. The nullification theory, therefore, does not explain the
character evidence rule.
C. Prejudice Due to Misestimation and Exaggeration of the Probative
Value of Character Evidence
Another possible rationale for the character evidence rule-a
rationale said to be championed by Wigmore-is that jurors are
particularly prone to give character evidence more weight than it
deserves. 4 I will refer to this as the juror-inflation-of-probative-value
rationale for the character evidence rule-or the "JIPV" rationale,
for short.
The JIPV rationale for the character evidence rule is not
necessarily equivalent to the "corrosion-of-inferential-reasoning-
capacity-due-to-emotion-and-passion" rationale described in Part
I.B.1, supra. While it is true that passion may lead to the
misestimation and exaggeration of the probative value of character-
because of the destructive effect that passion and emotion can have
on the capacity of jurors to reason-the JIPV rationale asserts that
jurors, whether or not impassioned, are particularly prone to
misestimate and overestimate the probative value of character
evidence.
The JIPV thesis faces several difficulties. One difficulty is that
while some of the proponents of this thesis invoke the authority of
Wigmore to support the proposition that jurors and juries simply are
not very good at assessing character evidence and have a special
propensity to exaggerate the probative value of character, 5 Wigmore
A18; Otto G. Obermaier, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Tries to Nullify Jury
Nullification, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1997, at 7. I am inclined to think (but I cannot prove) that
judges do "nullify" the law on a fairly regular basis, but that they do so in subtle and
disguised ways-for example, by excluding evidence for reasons that they themselves
think are incorrect or by "interpreting" the law in ways that they believe are incorrect.
14. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
15. The Supreme Court itself did this some time ago in Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475.
There have been other sinners. See, e.g. Roberson v. State, 218 P.2d 414, 423 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1950).
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himself rather clearly said that both judges and jurors tend to
exaggerate the probative value of character evidence." So Wigmore
embraced the J J I P V rationale for the character evidence rule-
judge-and-juror-inflation-of-probative-value (of character evidence)
-rather than the J I P V rationale-juror-inflation-of-probative-
value.
A second and more substantial difficulty with the JIPV theory is
that the character evidence rule ostensibly applies in bench trials as
well as in jury trials. But perhaps this is not a fatal difficulty because
perhaps it is true, as some observers claim, that the character
evidence rule, though nominally applicable in trials without a jury, is
effectively relaxed-and thereby eviscerated-in bench trials.17
Although I am not fully convinced that the relaxation of the character
evidence rule in bench trials amounts to its evisceration,8 it is not
important that this particular question be resolved here and now.
There is a more fundamental difficulty with the JIPV rationale, one
that does not depend on the question of the extent of the relaxation
16. See 1A WIGMORE supra note 5, §58.2, at 1212 ("The natural and inevitable
tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive weight to the
vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either allow it to bear too strongly on the
present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation."). Cf. id., §57, at
1185 ("But, as a pure question of policy, the [character evidence] doctrine is and can be
supported as one better calculated than the opposite to lead to just verdicts. The deep
tendency of human nature to punish not because our victim is guilty this time but because
he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught is a tendency that
cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.").
17. See Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence:
Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1003, 1008-09 (1984) ("Objections to the use of character evidence are largely
ignored when a case is tried to a judge. Although the general rule is that the jury trial
system of evidence governs trials to the court, the rules are often relaxed when the judge
sits as the trier of fact. The reason is that the rules of evidence are viewed as the product
of the jury system-rules designed principally to protect lay jurors from the prejudicial
effects of unreliable evidence.") (footnotes omitted).
18. See generally 1 WIGMORE, supra note 5, §4d.1, at 221-28 (saying that although
rules of evidence are relaxed in bench trials, it is an exaggeration to say that rules of
evidence do not apply in bench trials). See also State v. Forsland, 326 N.W.2d 688 (N.D.
1982) (specifically discussing nonjury character of trial and special problems of enforcing
proscriptions on uses of evidence in bench trials, making clear that character evidence
rule must be applied in bench trials). See also 1 WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 227 ("rules
regarding character evidence are routinely applied in criminal cases") (citing State v. Jost,
241 A.2d 316, 323 (Vt. 1968) (reversing conviction because of improper admission and use
of character evidence against a criminal defendant in a nonjury saying, "[c]haracter is
never an issue in criminal proceedings unless and until the accused makes it so at trial.")).
Even if it is true that admissibility decisions in bench trials are effectively insulated
from appellate review, it does not necessarily follow that trial judges in bench trials will
routinely disregard rules of evidence such as the character evidence rule. If trial judges
believe they are obligated to follow the character evidence rule in bench trials, they may
do so even if they think they can "get away" with not doing so.
Mar. 1998]
of the character evidence rule in bench trials.
The third and most fundamental difficulty with the JIPV
rationale is that the assumption that jurors, rather than judges, are
particularly prone to overestimate the probative value of character
evidence is unwarranted. There is no good reason to believe that a
single judge, who is likely to be relatively isolated and separated from
ordinary life and ordinary people by virtue of her professional
education and professional position (a good many people seem to
think that one of the implicit purposes of legal education is to make
law students and lawyers less human and humane), is to be better
qualified than a jury of twelve, eight, or six people, drawn from a
cross-section of the community and having a variety of backgrounds
and experiences, to make sound inferences about the probative force
of human character. 19
It is possible that by talking about the abilities of juries and
jurors I am riding (and beating) the wrong horse. Perhaps the way to
understand the IPV thesis-the "inflation of probative value"
thesis-is not to read it as the J I P V thesis-"juror-inflation-of-
probative-value" thesis-but, as Wigmore suggested, as the J J I P V
thesis-"judge-and-juror-inflation-of-probative-value" thesis-or,
alternatively, as the E I P V thesis-the thesis that everyone does it.
This strikes me as the better and more charitable interpretation of
19. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 10a n.22, at 688 ("It is sometimes said that the
superior 'experience' of the trial judge warrants the assumption that the trial judge may
better estimate the probative value of evidence. See, e.g., CLEARY, MCCORMICK*S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §185 (2d ed. 1972).... But the claim that the
judge has superior experience or insight is usually simply gratuitous and unsupported.
How does sitting in a courtroom, as opposed to, for example, working in a factory or
raising a family or anything else confer such superior experience and insight? Might one
not say with equal force that courtroom 'experience' or legal practice or training distorts
insights into human motivation and character?"). See also Roger C. Park, Character
Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson Case-or, Rationales of the Character Evidence Ban,
with Illustrations from the Simpson Case, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 747, 770 (1996) ("In
general, juries should have the authority to decide questions of fact in criminal cases.
Group fact-finding by a body relatively untainted by self-interest is likely to be more
accurate, under the peculiar conditions of a criminal trial, than fact-finding by a single
judge.") (footnote omitted).
A substantial body of research in social science supports the view that jurors
generally do an excellent job of assessing evidence. See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D.
PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Michael J. Saks, Small-
Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks, Report to Fed. Jud. Center.
1981. Although I take comfort in that literature, I do not rely on it. I simply believe that
jurors-particularly juries-are better able than judges to assess evidence. Common
sense suggests that a group of conscientious and ordinary people is particularly well-
qualified to make judgments about the probative force of matters of common experience
such as human character. This common sense should be abandoned only in the face of
compelling scientific evidence to the contrary.
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the IPV thesis.
Is it possible that this thesis-that all human beings and all triers
of fact, whether judges or jurors, tend to misestimate and exaggerate
the probative value of character evidence- justifies the character
evidence rule?
I think not.
The thesis that both judges and jurors regularly exaggerate the
value of character evidence is reminiscent of the Kahneman-Tversky
thesis that ordinary people commit a large variety of inferential
blunders and suffer from a wide variety of cognitive illusions.'
Perhaps this similarity should sound a note of caution. The
Kahneman-Tversky thesis came out in a blaze of glory, and many
people were apparently initially persuaded that the general thrust of
the Kahneman-Tversky thesis-if not its every detail-was correct.
Over time, however, a substantial number of informed observers
have questioned the hypothesis that ordinary people tend to be
inferential morons.1
There is good reason to be extremely suspicious of claims that all
people-or practically' all people, in any event-are incapable of
judging the true value of character evidence. One wonders, for
example, how observers such as Wigmore-who are themselves also
only human-knew that trial judges and jurors tend to make more
out of character evidence than they should. To know when character
evidence is being given more weight than it deserves requires that
one know the true weight of the evidence. Were observers such as
Wigmore "well-positioned" to make judgments that particular trial
judges or particular juries in particular cases gave character evidence
more weight than it was worth? Is it not likely that the trial judges
and juries in any such cases had more detailed knowledge of the
character evidence in the case and its larger evidentiary context than
did observers such as Wigmore, whose knowledge of such evidence
20. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
21. See L. Jonathan Cohen, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally
Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SC. J. 317 (1981); L.L. Lopes, The Rhetoric of
Irrationality, 1 THEORY AND PSYCHOL. 65 (1991); Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make
Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond 'Heuristics and Biases', in 2 EUR. REV. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 83 (1991); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Myth, 4 PSYCHOL. 49
(1993); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Normative, Descriptive
and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SCI. J. 1 (1996). See also the
"peer commentary" on Koehler's "Base Rate" article, 19 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SCI. J. at
17-41, most of which agrees with the thrust of Koehler's critique of the Kahneman and
Tversky view of the way that ordinary people use and misuse "base rate" information.
22. This qualification is necessary if one wishes to avoid the Cretan Liar problem: an
observer may want to say that practically all people are morons but he puts himself in an
awkward position if admits that he is also a moron.
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was probably based largely on second-hand and incomplete accounts
such as appellate opinions and newspaper articles? Or did they
instead simply assume that participants in cases and controversies-
participants such as trial judges and jurors-are particularly prone to
misjudge the value of character evidence? If that was the implicit
assumption, was it correct? Why should non-partisan participants in
trials-participants such as trial judges and jurors-have a special
proclivity to inflate the probative value of character evidence? Or
did observers such as Wigmore instead rely on general assumptions
about human nature, in particular on the assumption that people in
general tend to misjudge the probative value of character evidence?'
I am not convinced that there are satisfactory answers to such
questions. But in my mind there is an even more fundamental
difficulty with the EIPV thesis-the thesis that (practically) everyone
has a tendency to inflate the probative value of character evidence.
Its underlying premise-the generally weak probative force of
character evidence-is either false or an oversimplification. As I
stated in response to the "meager probative force rationale" for the
character evidence rule, character evidence is often very probative.
This simple proposition devastates the EIPV thesis-and the
JIPV thesis as well. Suppose that character evidence ordinarily has a
substantial amount of probative value. Now consider whether it
would still make sense to say that triers of fact tend to overestimate
the value of probative evidence. The possibility that the proposition
is true theoretically still exists: it is logically possible to exaggerate
the probative value of extremely probative evidence. But if it is true
that triers of fact are generally good at performing inferential tasks,
as our system of factual adjudication necessarily assumes, there is
little reason to credit the argument that triers of fact are particularly
prone to overestimate the value of character evidence. The more
plausible and parsimonious thesis is that when triers of fact accord
character evidence substantial weight, they do so for good reason. z4
23. Apart from these questions concerning the basis of common declarations about
the alleged incapacity of judges and jurors to make sound judgments about the probative
value of character evidence, one might wonder whether judges and jurors are incapable of
self-correction-that is, whether judges and jurors, if told or reminded that there is a
danger of exaggerating the force of character evidence, would be unable or unwilling to
take adequate steps to prevent themselves from exaggerating the significance of any
character evidence that they might be allowed to see.
24. It is arguable that the case for the exclusion of character evidence because of the
tendency of triers of fact to exaggerate the force of such evidence becomes less
compelling and more problematic if one believes that character evidence generally has a
great deal of probative value, though not as much probative value as judges and jurors
tend to think. It is not entirely clear, however, that this particular argument, common in
the context of Rule 403 assessments, holds water. A plausible argument can be made that
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There is no good reason to treat triers of fact as inferential idiots. 25
H. Human Character and Human Autonomy
A. The Notion of Autonomy in General
Although the concept of human autonomy plays a prominent
role in fields such as substantive criminal law,26 that concept rarely
figures in discussions of the character evidence rule.27 In the course of
any demonstrable exaggeration of the probative value of any evidence-regardless of the
extent of the "real" probative value of such evidence-generates an equal risk that the
trier of fact will find that legally-required probability exists when in fact it does not exist
or, if the character evidence is used negatively, that a legally-required probability does
not exist when in fact it does.
An exception applies, however, when the evidence in question is so strong that, taken
by itself (or, in any event, with practically uncontroverted facts), it surpasses the legally-
required probability standard (or, if used negatively, the character evidence in question
taken practically by itself negates the legally-required probability of some fact in issue).
25. If it is said that ordinary people are no d-d good at judging evidence and
probabilities, the proper rejoinder is always, "Compared to what?" The bare conclusion
that ordinary people make errors in reasoning about evidence, facts, and probabilities is
both unsurprising and uninteresting.
26. See, HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMiTs OF THE CRIMiNAL SANCTION 132 (1968)
("We must put up with the bother of the insanity defense because to exclude it is to
deprive the criminal law of its chief paradigm of free will. The criminal sanction ... does
not rest on an assertion that human conduct is a matter of free choice; that philosophic
controversy is irrelevant. In order to serve purposes far more significant than even the
prevention of socially undesirable behavior, the criminal sanction operates as if human
beings have free choice.")
27. Courts today rarely if ever suggest that the character evidence rule owes its
existence to a concern for human autonomy. Moreover, very few legal scholars have ever
suggested that human autonomy may be the foundation of the character evidence rule. I
believe I am one of a very few observers ever to make such a suggestion. See 1A
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 54.1, at 1151. Talk about autonomy has occasionally surfaced
in discussions and debates about the rape victim shield laws. See Ronet Bachman &
Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How
Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 563 (1993); Richard A.
Wayman, Note, Lucas Comes to Visit Iowa: Balancing Interests Under Iowa's Rape-Shield
Evidentiary Rule, 77 IOWA L. REV. 865, 894 n. 243 (1992); Sakthi Murthym, Comment,
Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual
History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. REV. 541, 552
(1991); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engineered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 425, 438; Harriett
Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second
Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 776 (1986); 1A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 62.1, at 1327.
The discussion there, however, focuses on treating women as free to engage in certain
types of sexual behavior. It does not address the question of human autonomy in general.
The issue under discussion here-the possible influence of the general notion of
human autonomy on the character evidence rule-does seem to be unambiguously similar
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a renowned discussion of the character evidence rule, however,
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo said, "In a very real sense a defendant
starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the
bar."28 This comment suggests, though it was probably not designed
to assert,29 that the notion of autonomy has something to do with the
character evidence rule. But, regardless of whether any American
judge, law maker, or legal scholar has ever attempted to use
autonomy to justify or explain the character evidence rule, might
autonomy do so? This is the question I will discuss in this section.
Before I do so, however, I need to make a distinction between two
versions of the notion of autonomy and, thus, between two types of
arguments based on the notion of autonomy.
Autonomy may be seen either as an ideal or as a fact. Each
conception generates a different argument. An argument appealing
to the ideal of autonomy has a prescriptive, moral, or normative
character; it favors the character evidence rule on the ground that the
rule reflects how human beings should work. Such an argument is
aspirational. An argument appealing to the fact of autonomy, by
contrast, is a "practical", or "realistic" argument. It defends the
character evidence rule on the ground that the rule accurately reflects
how human beings in fact work.3 °
The bulk of this part of the paper discusses a "prescriptive"
version of an autonomy-based argument for a prohibition against the
use of evidence of character to show conduct. The very last section
to the notion of autonomy that comes into play in some discussions of substantive
criminal law. In those discussions it is sometimes said that it is important to punish people
for misconduct because it is important to treat people (including wrongdoers) as
autonomous beings who are capable of self-determination. See PACKER, supra note 26.
This is very much the notion of autonomy whose implications for the character evidence
rule I am exploring here.
28. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
29. Cardozo's rhetoric about starting afresh seems to have little to do with the idea
of autonomy. The thrust of Cardozo's argument in Zackowitz seems to be that triers of
fact are likely to let their emotions get the better of them and that they are likely
(therefore?) to overestimate the probative value of character evidence. See id. at 468.
After using the fresh start language, Cardozo proceeds to say, in the same paragraph, that
the "law is not blind to the peril to the innocent if character is accepted as probative of
crime," id., and he concludes by approving Wigmore's condemnation of character
evidence because of the "tendency of the tribunal ... [to] give excessive weight to the
vicious record of crime .... Id.
30. In some quarters-particularly in social science, it seems-it is common to
segregate theories into normative theories and descriptive theories. This taxonomy does
not work well here, principally because the "practical" theory that I describe is not (as
yet) a purely "descriptive" theory, but it is also not a purely prescriptive or normative
theory. There is something missing in the traditional taxonomy of types of theories. See
Peter Tillers & David Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, 24 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 931, 1010 - 12 (1991).
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of this part of the paper has a very brief discussion of a "realistic"
version of an autonomy-based argument in defense of the character
evidence prohibition.
B. The Character Evidence Rule: An Appropriate Expression of the Ideal
of Human Autonomy?
Roughly two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant argued (at great
length) that the principle or ideal of human dignity requires that
people be treated as autonomous creatures who are capable of
determining their own actions.31 I will refer to this theory, from time
to time, as the "VoA" theory-the "value of autonomy" theory.
This VoA thesis of an intimate or necessary connection between
dignity and autonomy still commands respect in a good many
quarters.32 Let us suppose that this thesis or hypothesis also
commands your respect and mine. Hence, let me assume for now
that all of us assent to the following two propositions:
(i) human dignity is itself an ideal, value, or norm that the law is
required to respect (and also, perhaps, "reinforce" and "support"),
and
(ii) to support the ideal of human dignity, law and society must
treat human beings as autonomous and self-governing creatures.
Having established (somehow)33 the value of human autonomy,
and having also established (somehow)34 the importance of having
31. Kant made this argument on numerous occasions. For an excellent summary of
Kant's philosophy see the entry for Immanuel Kant in THE CAMBRIDGE DICrIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY 398 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
32. The type of VoA theory described in the text appears most frequently in
theorizing about substantive criminal law and criminal responsibility. In that context it is
often said that it is important for the law to treat human beings as autonomous beings
who are capable of determining their own actions. See PACKER, supra note 26.
33. The possibility of a logical demonstration of the importance of the value of
autonomy is beyond the scope of this paper.
34. It should be noted that the alleged importance of having the law "treat" human
beings as autonomous creatures does not follow directly from the premise that human
autonomy is an important value or an overriding value. It is not immediately apparent
that the law's failure to treat human beings as autonomous creatures abridges the value of
human autonomy. For example, one might adopt the Pietistic position that human
freedom and worth lie solely in the workings of the inner human heart or soul and that no
"external" actions or pains can possibly abridge the worth, dignity, or freedom of the
human soul. Alternatively, one might take the position that the content of human law is
immaterial because, whatever that content might be, human beings have the capacity to
make free choices and decisions within the constraints and limitations (however severe)
that the law imposes. In short, one must give some reason for claiming that the presumed
value of human autonomy has specific implications for the way that law deals with human
beings. Here again, however, the question of the nature of this link lies far beyond the
scope of this paper.
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the law treat human beings as autonomous creatures, one might
undertake to demonstrate that the character evidence rule is a
necessary legal doctrine or, in any event, a useful or appropriate one.
This argument would begin with the claim that the use of character
evidence to show conduct is inconsistent with the principle of
autonomy because to allow the use of character to show conduct
effectively and publicly embraces the proposition that people's
conduct can be caused, not by themselves, but by their character.
Hence, the law should outlaw the use of character to show conduct
because by doing so the law commits itself to the proposition that
character does not cause conduct, a position consistent with the ideal
of autonomy.
The "value of autonomy" argument for the character evidence
rule that I have just described presupposes that the use of character
evidence is incompatible with the morally mandated (but possibly
untrue) premise of human autonomy. This presupposition seems to
depend on two further presuppositions, which are as follows:
(i) the use of character as evidence implies that character causes
people to act the way that they do, and
(ii) people are not autonomous, or self-governing, if their
character causes them to act the way that they do.
Now that we have the VoA theory before us, let us consider
whether this theory holds water. Let us consider, in particular, three
possible rejoinders to the argument that the use of character as
evidence contravenes the morally mandated premise or ideal of
human autonomy. In so doing, let us see what (if anything) these
rejoinders tell us about human character.
REJOINDER NO. 1: RELEVANCE AND CAUSALITY: RELEVANCE
DOES NOT IMPLY CAUSATION.
The VoA argument against character evidence implicitly but
necessarily rests on the proposition that the relevance of character to
behavior implies that character causes behavior. Were society to
embrace character evidence, the VoA theory posits, society would
embrace the notion that human beings are automatons
The VoA theory as I have just described (and refined) it
probably raises any number of issues and objections, but at this point
I want to limit discussion to just one particular objection, or
rejoinder, to the VoA argument in favor of the ban against character
evidence. This rejoinder directly attacks the proposition that any
supposition of the relevance of character to behavior implies that
character causes behavior. It maintains character may be a basis for a
valid inference about behavior yet not be a cause of behavior.
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This rejoinder questions the connection between relevance and
causality. It proposes that it is possible for an event or state of affairs
to serve as a sign, indicator, or evidence of another event or state of
affairs even if there is no causal connection or connections between
the state or event that serves as a sign of another state or event and
the state or event whose existence is suggested or shown by the state
or event that serves as a sign.
The thesis that relevance does not imply causation may seem
pertinent to an assessment of the VoA thesis of a necessary conflict
between circumstantial character evidence and the value or norm of
human autonomy. For if it is in fact true that one "state of the
world" can serve as a sign of another state of the world in the absence
of any causal relationship between those two states, there appears to
be a logical possibility that "character" can serve as evidence of
"behavior" even if character has no causal relationship (either direct
or indirect) with behavior. Thus, as applied to the phenomenon of
character evidence, the first possible explanation for the inability of
the VoA thesis to justify a legal prohibition against the
"circumstantial" use of character evidence is that the ability to use
character to predict or infer behavior does not necessarily imply that
character has a causal connection to the behavior that it predicts or
suggests.
I regret to say that the VoA argument for the prohibition against
character evidence cannot be disposed of this easily. For if one
undertakes a careful analysis of the thesis that something can be
relevant to the proof of an event without having caused the event,
one quickly reaches the conclusion that the question of whether
relevance implies causation is far more complicated than the
arguments sketched thus far suggest. One can concede, for example,
that an event serving as evidence can postdate the event for which it
is evidence and yet insist that there must be a causal link between the
later event and the event that it is thought to evidence. One might
argue, for example, that the later event serves as evidence of the
earlier event if and only if the later event is caused (directly or
indirectly) by the earlier event. More generally, one might argue that
any two events that have no causal connection can have, in the nature
of things, only a coincidental connection and that a purely
coincidental connection can never have-in the nature of things-any
probative force.
Quite apart from these general considerations, the rejoinder
based on the possibility-of-relevance-without-causation seems to
have a vicious failing in the present context: it seems to be immaterial
to the VoA argument for the character evidence rule. Even if it is
possible for other kinds of evidence to be probative of a hypothesis in
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the absence of a causal connection between the evidence and the
hypothesis, character evidence seems relevant and probative precisely
because, only because, and only when there is a belief in the
existence of some kind of a causal link between character and
behavior. We may think, for example, that character evidence is
relevant because we think that a certain kind of character trait makes
certain kind of behavior more probable. Hence, whatever may be
said of other evidence of behavior-that is, even if some evidence
may be relevant to behavior without having a causal connection with
it-the relevance of character evidence does seem to depend on our
judgment or belief that character does have a causal link with
behavior.
My analysis here suggests that the relevance-without-causation
thesis is not a valid ground for rejecting a normative VoA rationale
for the character evidence rule. But my analysis has suggested
something else. The relevance-is-possible-without-causation
rejoinder to the VoA theory might make an observer object that
character has a causal connection with behavior. This hypothetical
observer might reason along the following lines:
Well, if I am inclined to think that character evidence is relevant, it
must follow that I also believe that character influences behavior.
In any event, I believe that a person's character can influence that
person's behavior and I can readily imagine situations in which I
think character evidence is relevant precisely because and only
because I believe that.
As I shall shortly show, my hypothetical observer exaggerates a little:
it is not true that if one thinks that character and behavior are
causally connected, one is compelled also to believe that character
causes or influences behavior." Nonetheless, my hypothetical
observer does make an important point: it is both possible and
probable that character "causes" or influences behavior. This point,
which is practically a truism,36 warrants special emphasis.
35. See infra pp. 19-26 (discussing rejoinder No.2).
36. I readily grant that the proposition of the possible influence of character on
conduct is practically a truism. There are two reasons why I am happy to make this
concession. First, the proposition that character may cause or influence behavior is a
crucial part of my general argument; it is a fact that I claim must be carefully taken into
account in any "reconceptualization" of the character evidence rule. Second, it is no
reproach to a theory to say it rests on truisms. Quite often the novel thing about a theory
or a theoretical perspective is its elaboration of the implications of "common sense" or
"self-evident" truths. Theorists have reason to be pleased if other observers believe that
their theories rest on practically unshakable foundations.
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REJOINDER No. 2: DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSATION: IF
THERE IS A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND
HYPOTHESIS, THE CONNECTION BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND
HYPOTHESIS (AND BETWEEN CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND THE
HUMAN CONDUCT N ISSUE) CAN BE INDIRECT.
Another possible rejoinder to the VoA rationale for the
character evidence rule challenges the VoA theory's hypothesis that
a belief in the relevance of character evidence logically implies or
entails the belief that character causes or influences conduct. This
attempted rebuttal maintains that even if one believes that evidence
has probative force only because it points to a cause and effect
relationship -if one makes the judgment that "character" is
indicative of "behavior"-it does not follow that one must reach the
conclusion that "character" causes "behavior." It is possible that the
causal connection between evidence such as "character" and a
hypothesis such as "behavior" is indirect. Thus, even if there must be
a causal connection between evidence and hypothesis, it is possible
that the evidence is causally connected to some other variable, which
may be a "hidden" or "omitted variable," which is in turn connected
to the hypothesis or possible fact.
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C = character (tendency to kill)
B = behavior (killing of V, a Black man)
[Vol. 49
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you might have Scenario 2 in Figure 2,
FIGURE 2
Where H = hatred or animus toward Blacks
In Scenario 2 the actor's character and his killing of V are
thought to have a common cause, the actor's hatred of Blacks.
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There are possible scenarios in addition to those shown in
Figures 1 and 2. For example, you might have the scenario (Scenario







In Scenario 3 hatred of Blacks generates a propensity to kill,
which generates the killing of V. In this scenario, however, character
remains an immediate cause of the actor's behavior.
[Vol. 49
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In this (fantastic) scenario B, the actor's killing of a Black man
generates H, a hatred of Blacks in the breast of the actor, which in
turn generates, or causes, C, a propensity to kill.
Scenarios 2 through 4 (in Figures 2 through 4 above) are meant
to support the thesis that even if one assumes that there is a causal
nexus between character and conduct, it does not follow that
character causes behavior. But Scenarios 2 through 4 fail to do the
job expected of them. Scenario 3, of course, misses the mark because
in that scenario character remains a direct cause of behavior.
Scenarios 4 and 2, however, also fail, but for somewhat different
reasons. The trouble is that Scenario 4 proves too little while
Scenario 2 proves too much.
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Consider Scenario 4. This scenario suggests the possibility that
character and hatred, instead of being the causes of the act or
behavior in question, are the effects of the act. The trouble with this
effort to bolster rejoinder number 2 is that Scenario 4 proves too
little: a concession that Scenario 4 is possible falls short of showing
that matters such as character and hatred cannot be causes rather
than effects. Hence, Scenario 4 fails to determine the basic
foundation for the VoA argument that law and society must outlaw
the use of character evidence. Scenario 4 merely requires a slight
modification in the VoA thesis, which must now read: law and
society must ignore human character when it is an antecedent cause,
rather than an effect, of human behavior.
Now consider again the chain of reasoning depicted in Scenario 2
in Figure 2, where hatred H is the "immediate" cause of behavior,





Where B = behavior, H = hatred, and C = character
[Vol. 49
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Scenario 2 does not relieve the actor from the "tyranny" of
having his behavior be caused or influenced by his character. But
Scenario 2 substitutes the "causal tyranny" of character with another:
the causal tyranny of hatred.37 Scenario 2 reveals that matters in
addition to character can cause or influence human conduct. Thus,
although Figure 2 depicts a situation in which a human actor's
autonomy is not abridged by the influence or power of character C,
Figure 2 does not depict a situation in which the actor is altogether
free of causal influences or constraints; the actor in Scenario 2
remains subject to the influence of his own prior hatred H. It is
therefore arguable that Scenario 2 proves too much. For if VoA
theory is right in assuming that society must treat people as
autonomous creatures and that society violates that obligation when
it allows the use of evidence of matters that cause people to act the
way they do, the situation depicted in Scenario 2 suggests that much
evidence of human conduct that is now admissible-matters such as
prior emotions, desires, attitudes, wishes, and even physical
circumstances-would have to be made inadmissible when such
matters are offered to show their influence on human behavior. In
sum, Scenario 2 suggests that much evidence of human character that
is presently admissible to show human conduct would have to be
made inadmissible in order to protect the ideal of human autonomy
in American law and in society.
The tendency of Scenario 2 to prove too much, however, does
not necessarily prove that Scenario 2 is a defective basis for an attack
on VoA theory. A critique that "proves too much" is not necessarily
flawed. Such a critique can expose a flaw or weakness in the position
being &ritiqued. In particular, the awkward consequences or
implications suggested by Scenario 2 may amount to a reductio ad
absurdum of VoA theory: the conclusions suggested by Scenario 2
about the amount and type of evidence that would have to be made
inadmissible if VoA theory were taken seriously and applied
consistently may demonstrate that VoA theory is absurd.
An appeal to "unacceptable" consequences can make an
argument or theory "absurd" in different ways. Do the implications
of VoA theory for the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence of
human conduct show that a VoA rationale for the character evidence
rule must be rejected because the consequences of a VoA rationale-
the loss of a great deal of probative evidence of human conduct-are
just too great? Or do those implications of VoA theory for the
37. Scenario 3 (Figure 3, supra at 22) arguably presents a greater affront to the ideal
of autonomy than does Scenario 1 (Figure 1, supra at 20) because Scenario 3 not only
assumes that character is the immediate cause of an actor's behavior, but also that the
actor's character itself is the effect of a prior cause.
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process of proof in litigation demonstrate that there is a logical defect
in VoA theory-that VoA theory is, in some sense, incoherent, self-
contradictory, or, literally, nonsense?
The awkward implications of VoA theory for the admissibility of
evidence of human conduct do not demonstrate that VoA theory is
literally incoherent. But they do raise a serious question about the
validity of the assumptions that VoA theory makes about the nature
of autonomy. In particular, the awkward conclusion that evidence of
matters such as hatred ought to be inadmissible suggests that there is
a defect in the idea that human autonomy requires (absolute)
freedom from causality. I will address this point next, in my
discussion of rejoinder number 3. Before I do that, however, I want
to reiterate and emphasize the central moral of this discussion of
Rejoinder 2 and Scenario 2:
If the ideal of autonomy-in the sense of freedom from causal
influence-is one's dominant concern, it is very difficult to make a
principled distinction between evidence of character, on the one
hand, and evidence of many other matters-such as emotions-that
can influence human conduct, on the other hand.
The importance of this moral reaches beyond the question of the
validity of VoA theory because it may prove to be difficult to
distinguish between character and matters such as emotions and
desires even if one has an entirely different explanation (one not
based on autonomy) for the character evidence rule. I will have more
to say about this point in Part III of this paper.
REJOINDER No. 3: CHOICE AND CAUSALITY: CAUSALITY IS
NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH AUTONOMY
The most forceful rejoinder to the treat-people-as-autonomous
theory-the VoA rationale for the character evidence rule-is that
even if it is granted that matters such as "character" cause, or
influence, "behavior," it does not necessarily follow that any
particular instance of human behavior is not self-determined.
In the analysis thus far I have been tacitly assuming that
"character" is an inherited bundle of traits or, in any event, a set of
unchosen traits, characteristics, and dispositions. If, however,
"character" is voluntarily assumed or chosen by the actor, then the
cause of "behavior" is a chosen state of affairs, not an inherited one
and it may be appropriate to say that the act "caused" by the actor's
character is an act that was chosen by the actor.
If "character," like "behavior," may be a consequence of an
actor's free decision, you can have Scenario 5, which is structurally
similar to Scenario 2:




Where D = (free) decision
In the situation depicted in Figure 5 a human choice or decision
produces or creates a certain behavior, but it also literally creates
"character." In this instance, the actor's character still serves as
evidence of the actor's behavior, but only because it serves as
evidence of a prior decision by the actor. Q.E.D.: the use of
character to predict or infer behavior does not necessarily entail the
conclusion that inherited or unchosen character alone determines, or
predetermines, behavior.
There are two questions that one might ask about this attack on
the foundations of VoA theory. First, is the attack sound? Second,
does the attack suggest the existence of any features of human
character that are important for our purpose-the purpose, that is, of
rethinking the character evidence rule?
The answer to the first question is, I think, uncertain. For
example, the mere fact that an action can be "caused" by a human
choice or decision is not a decisive demonstration that human beings
have the ability to act autonomously in a world that is subject to
causality. There is the complication, for example, that an actor's
choice may itself be the effect of some antecedent event. Perhaps,
for example, someone issued a threat T to the actor, saying kill
Victim or I will shoot you. Consequently, we have the following
situation:





Despite the existence of antecedent causes-the existence, that
is, of antecedent matters or events that influence human decisions
and choices -it is still possible that human beings have the capacity
to act "autonomously." This refined autonomy differs from the
previous, absolute concept of autonomy, but the precise difference
may be expressed in different ways. One might argue, for example,
as G.W.F. Hegel did, that free choice is not synonymous with
unconstrained choice and that the concept of autonomy, or freedom,
is-to use modern academic jargon-incoherent in the absence of
constraints or limitations. Hegel put it in the following way on one
occasion:
My willing is not pure willing but the willing of something.
A will which ... wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing
and is therefore no will at all. The particular volition is a
restriction, since the will, in order to be a will, must restrict itself
in some way or other. The fact that the will wills something is
restriction, negation.38
38. G.W.F HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 16A, at 228 (T.M. Knob trans., 1967).
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Alternatively, one might argue, as Glenn Shafer has-but in a
very different context and for a very different purpose -that many of
us are prone to misunderstand the concept of "causality." Shafer
suggests that we think of our pictures of temporal links and
influences as experiments that both humans and nature conduct with
the world? 9  We make a basic mistake, he suggests, when we
transform our pictures of the world into the world itself. Thus, if we
have the experience of being free and making free choices, Shafer's
argument implies (although little in his argument suggests that he
himself has considered the precise question that I am wrestling with
here), there is little or nothing in the bare notion of causality that
forces us to think that we lack the ability to make our own choices.
Such issues about the "true" meaning of causality are both very
interesting and very difficult. But I will not pursue them further here
because I am, frankly, more interested in the second general question
that I posed above. I have been playing a little bit of a trick on you. I
am not greatly interested in the question of whether the ideal of
autonomy can explain or justify a prohibition against the use of
character to show conduct. Thinkers such as Kant, of course, took
the "problem" of human autonomy very seriously. But I do not
believe that legal scholars today-except perhaps scholars of
substantive criminal law-worry nearly as much as Kant and some of
his contemporaries did about the possibility that human beings are
always mere automatons.# Autonomy-based arguments are
therefore important not primarily because of what they say about the
possibility of human autonomy, but mainly because of what such
arguments and what attacks on such arguments reveal about human
character.
The second general question I posed is whether Rejoinder No. 3
suggests something about human beings that is of importance for the
39. See GLENN SHAFER, THE ART'OF CAusAL CONJECrURE 2 (1996) ("Nature is an
idealization that cannot be avoided in an account of causality, but it is dangerously
misleading to think of nature as pure object. By thinking of nature as an observer, we
keep within our sight the role of actual observers in defining nature as a limiting
idealization, and we thereby keep in touch with the subjective aspects of nature and
causality.").
40. I think this is partly because our understanding of our cosmos is very different
from Kant's; most of us no longer think of the cosmos as a natural order that is rigidly
governed by inexorable "causal" laws. I suspect that it is also partly because our moral
sensibility is also different from Kant's. Today most of us are not tortured-as Kant
was-by the possibility that we are morally worthless because we are unable to take any
action solely for the sake of principle. Few present-day real-world judges, law-makers, or
legal scholars are likely to let their deliberations about the character evidence rule be
influenced by the notion that the rule should express the law's fidelity to the abstract ideal
of human autonomy.
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project of rethinking the character evidence rule. The answer is
"yes." The thesis of Rejoinder No. 3 is that character, rather than
being the cause of behavior, may be the result or effect of an actor's
decisions. The mere statement of this thesis-whether the thesis be
true or false-suggests that human behavior may be the result (at
least in part) of an internal decision making system, some sort of
operating system that is internal to human beings.
Rejoinder No. 3 questions the proposition that the hypothesized
existence of a causal connection between character and conduct
logically implies that people are unfree: Rejoinder No. 3 asserts that
the mere fact of the inferential significance of character for conduct
does not mandate the conclusion that human beings live in a prison-
house of traits and attributes that they have merely inherited or
otherwise acquired, willy-nilly, through no choice of their own.
Whether or not this argument succeeds in disproving the thesis that a
causal connection between character and conduct implies the
unfreedom of human actors, Rejoinder No. 3 does suggest or, at least,
evoke a very important proposition. The argument of Rejoinder No.
3 (unlike the argument of Rejoinder No. 2) shows that it is logically
permissible to suppose that matters such as "choice" and "decision"
can "cause" or influence behavior. This is a logical possibility
because, as Figure 5 shows, it is logically permissible to believe that a
phenomenon such as "character" serves as evidence of conduct
because-or, even, only because -"character" serves as a sign or
indicium of human "choice" or "decision." In other words, (i) it is
logically permissible to suppose that "character" is "caused" by
matters or events such as "choice" and "decision," and, (ii) that being
so, it is logically possible to take "character" as evidence of some
"choice" or "decision."
The observation that decisions can cause or influence actions is
interesting for my purposes, not so much because of what it says
about the possibility of human autonomy, but principally because of
what it suggests about the likely "causes" or sources of human
behavior and conduct. The underlying intuition of VoA theory is
that "character" is an alien thing that can drive people to do things
that they do not necessarily choose to do. The underlying intuition of
the attack on VoA theory pictured in Figure No. 5 is that a person's
"character" is not, somehow, alien to the person who has such-and-
such a character, but that a person's character is in some sense his
own. This way of thinking and talking, to be sure, does not explain in
any clear way why character is or is not incompatible with human
autonomy. But this way of thinking about character-that is,
thinking about character as belonging to a person and being part of a
person-does suggest that the right way to begin to understand
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human character (either in general or the character of particular
people) is by keeping in mind that a person's character is closely
connected to that person's makeup.
The scenario depicted in Figure No. 5 suggests yet another
important lesson about the character of character. Viewed from the
perspective of that scenario-the perspective, that is, of the
supposition that human decisions can cause (or influence) both
actions and character-there is no necessary inconsistency between
"character" and "autonomy." The consistency of behavior over time
that the word "character" usually signifies can be viewed as the
product of a pattern of choices, as a reflection of consistency of
decisions. This is an important possibility because it suggests that
character (like choice) may be the result of the logic (including
thinking and feeling) that drives or moves or inclines people to make
the decisions and choices that they make.
Let me describe the implications of Rejoinder No. 3 in a slightly
different way. Rejoinder No. 3 serves as a reminder (though not as a
demonstration) of an important general proposition about human
beings and human behavior:
Human beings have an internal operating system that directs,
regulates, or influences their behavior; they have within them a set
or collection of rules, principles, and operations that affect how
they behave.
One of my principal claims is that character evidence is
inferentially interesting because evidence about character may generate
knowledge about the "internal logic" or internal "operating system" of
a human actor. Hence, for my purposes, the most important upshot
of my analysis of the VoA theory is not so much the proposition that
the internal logic that drives or directs human actors is a self-chosen
logic as it is the (common sense)" proposition that there is some sort
of internal logic or mechanism that influences human behavior.
C. The Character Evidence Rule: An Appropriate Expression of the
(Alleged) Fact of Human Autonomy?
If one is befuddled by the twists and turns that I have just
described in the debates and discussions about the VoA rationale,
41.Even a friendly observer might wonder if I am justified in expending as much
intellectual capital as I do on my effort to bolster a proposition that many observers might
regard as a truism. I think the answer to that penetrating question is probably "yes"
because (if for no other reason!) much evidence scholarship on the character evidence
rule seems to ignore this "truism." A major part of the point of my argument is that much
discourse and literature about the law of evidence seem to ignore propositions about




one might try to cut through that tangle of arguments and counter-
arguments by making the simple and straightforward assertion that
the character evidence rule is warranted or required because people
in fact start out afresh each day-because people are in fact entirely
different, or discontinuous, entities from day to day. This gambit
attempts to replace the VoA rationale-the "value of autonomy"
rationale-with a FoA rationale-with a "fact of autonomy"
rationale.
As bold as it is, the FoA gambit for avoiding the twists and turns
of arguments about the VoA rationale does not wash. It cannot be
said that, because human beings are "spontaneous" or
"autonomous," the behavior of a human actor on one occasion is
never relevant to that same actor's behavior on another occasion.
There is something wrong with any notion of human autonomy or
spontaneity that suggests such a patently ludicrous conclusion.
Despite the existence of a substantial body of philosophical literature
that seems to question the proposition that there exist individual
human entities that persist over time, it is simply indubitable that
there is a significant degree of continuity in the behavior of most
human actors over time. The real question is, instead, what, if
anything, the law-and, in particular, the law of evidence-should
make of such continuity in the characteristics and behavior of human
beings.
I1. The Prohibition Against Circumstantial Character
Evidence: Appearance and Reality
The practice of using information about the human psyche as
evidence in criminal trials has a long pedigree in America. Long
before legal scholars of evidence generally acknowledged the
practice, trial lawyers were in the habit of using closing arguments to
tell stories about the motivations, beliefs, superstitions, delusions,
phobias, fears, hopes, ambitions, political beliefs, aspirations,
religious convictions, pretensions, vanity, self-loathing, resentments,
hatreds, affections, infatuations, moods, depressions, grief, sorrows,
bereavement, and other attitudes, thoughts, and feelings of the
people whose conduct may have played a part in shaping the events
and actions in issue at trial. In short, American trial lawyers have
been exploring and discussing human character in their closing
arguments for many years.42
42. See JIM M. PERDUE, WHO WILL SPEAK FOR THE VICTIM?: A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON PLAINTIFF'S JURY ARGUMENT 393-394 (edited version of actual arguments
in "The Case of the Errant Surgeon"; describing plaintiff as "passive" and "shy," in part
to explain why plaintiff, after developing post-surgical complications, failed to act more
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Whatever the character evidence rule may mean today, it does
not mean that it is impermissible to use evidence to paint a picture of
a person's psyche, his beliefs, his thinking, his aspirations, and the
like in order to show that the person did or did not act in a particular
way on a particular occasion. There is no meaningful sense (except in
a "technical" and arid legal sense) in which it can be said that the law
prohibits the use of evidence of a person's "character" to show
conduct. A person's way of thinking, his aspirations, and similar
matters are part of a person's "character." Vast amounts of evidence
about human character are routinely admitted under existing law-
without the benefit of any "exception" to the character evidence rule.
It is true that the existing character evidence rule is not wholly a
paper tiger: the rule does bar the admission of some character
evidence. But inadmissible character evidence is a small island in a
vast sea of admissible character evidence.
Dissection of the human psyche in the courtroom is not confined
to the closing argument. It also takes place during the process of
proof-in particular, in and through the submission of evidence that
"technically speaking" does not contravene the character evidence
rule. For example, without resorting to any exceptions to the
character evidence rule, courts have allowed parties to try to show
the doing or non-doing of a specific act by showing a person's
* evidence of an intent to deceive43
* greed'
* jealousy and greed45
aggressively and promptly to have them corrected); United States v. Fernandez, 94 F.3d
640, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22634, *40 (1st Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion) (argument
that defendant committed drug transaction because of greed); United States v. Leigh, 104
F.3d 356, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33499, *1-2 (2d Cir., 1996) (unpublished opinion)
(argument that defendant committed fraud because of greed); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629,
642 (1972) ("It has been held reversible error to call the defendant 'doubly vicious
because he demanded his full constitutional rights,' a 'cheap, scaly, slimy crook,' a 'leech
of society,' a user of 'Al Capone tactics of intimidation,' and a 'junkie, rat and "sculptor"
with a knife.' Courts have, however, found no error in cases in which the defendant was
called 'animalistic,' 'lowdown, degenerate and filthy,' 'a mad dog,' 'a rattlesnake,' 'a
trafficker in human misery,' 'a black-hearted traitor,' 'a hired gunfighter,' 'a creature of
the jungle,' 'a type of worm,' or 'a brute, a beast, an animal, a mad dog who does not
deserve to live."').
For a highly informative and deliciously entertaining discussion of insults and other
comments about character during closing argument see ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL
OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 10.25 (1991). See also Samuel R. Gross, "Make-Believe: The
Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance," 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843
(1998) (examples of references to character in closing arguments).
43.See United States v. Zimeri-Safie, 585 F. 2d 1318, 1321-22 (5th Cir. 1978)




o obsession with sex46
o interest in explosives
47
o desire to take revenge on a "snitch" (as well as evidence
suggesting that the defendant "was not just blowing off
steam," and evidence for the purpose of "[filling] in the
picture of [the defendant] as a man who was not well disposed
to those who snitched on him, who threatened others verbally
and physically, and who carried out his threats"),
48
o antipathy toward Roman Catholic priests
49
o motivations and beliefs of gang members, including their
loyalty to a gang and its hierarchy and their willingness to use
violence to defend their gang.5"
45. See Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ark. 1974) (discussing motives to
commit first degree murder).
46. See Boyle v. Johnson. 93 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 968
(1997). Boyle was indicted for capital murder during the course of committing or
attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault, and capital murder during the course of
kidnapping. Boyle argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his sexual
habits and drawings. See id. at 183. The court of appeals held that the evidence was
properly admitted. See id. at 185. The court said, "Evidence of Boyle's sexual obsession
was ... relevant to the issue of Boyle's future dangerousness; it tended to show that
Boyle 'would constitute a continuing threat to society.' TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981)." Id.
47. See People v. Daniels, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (defendant
charged with attempted murder by exploding a bomb in car).
48. State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn. 1992)
49. See State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1176 (La. 1979)
50. See United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied. 117 S.Ct.
392 (1996). The defendant was convicted of (1) conspiracy to distribute cocaine base: (2)
use or carrying of firearms during the commission of a drug trafficking crime: (3)
continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"); and (4) distribution of cocaine base. See id. at
648. The defendants were members of a gang.
"Story [one of the defendants] was a member of a street gang, specifically the
Mafia Insanes of the Almighty Vice Lord Nation. Thomas, Garnett. and
Bradford became involved with the gang by taking an oath of loyalty. Story
later provided Thomas and Garnett with a written copy of the oath and
principles of the gang, and Story and Thomas occasionally reminded Garnett
to follow the principles. The oath of the Almighty Vice Lord Nation, which the
government introduced into evidence, provides, in part, that 'nor in the threat of
death will I deny those brothers who stand beside me.' The principles of the
Mafia Insanes, which were also admitted into evidence, include a direction to
'obey all commands without question fear or doubt.' Trial testimony further
revealed that Vice Lords were not supposed to testify against fellow Vice Lords.
Many of the street dealers who worked under the defendants recognized that
the defendants, along with Garnett and Bradford, were affiliated with the Mafia
Insane Vice Lords. The district court admitted the preceding evidence despite
defendants' motion in limine to exclude all evidence of their gang affiliation."
Id. at 649. The court of appeals held that the admission of all of this evidence (including
the oath) was not error. Id. at 652-53.
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In one sensational case, prosecutors argued against severance of
fraud and murder charges for trial in the following way:
Desperate and deeply in debt, Craig Rabinowitz had a choice:
Confess his deceitful double life to friends and family-or kill his
wife to collect on a $2 million life insurance policy.
Telling all would mean disgrace and a life of shambles. Killing
Stefanie Rabinowitz meant no more debt and the chance to fulfill a
fantasy-with Summer, the topless dancer of his dreams.
When it came time to be a man, prosecutors say, Craig Rabinowitz
became a murderer.
"Rabinowitz chose murder and deceit over coming clean to those
around him," writes Montgomery County Prosecutor Bruce L.
Castor Jr. in a brief filed Monday in Norristown, Pa.
"He simply could not bear the thought of being found out." ...
Castor argues that Rabinowitz's fraud case helps establish the
motive, premeditation and malice of the murder.51
In a number of cases, courts have sanctioned the use of evidence to
show a person's mental or psychic world even though the evidence
harbors information about the defendants' racial, political, or
religious beliefs.52 Examples of such admissible evidence about
51. Prosecutors Say Man Killed Wife for Insurance Money, THE WASHINGTON POST,
August 27, 1997, at A15.
52- See infra note 58. There are occasional manifestations of judicial unease with the
use of matters such as religious or political beliefs to show the doing or non-doing of an
act. Such uneasiness about the use of matters such as religious belief to show conduct
surfaced in a classic case that is now generally viewed as being principally about the habit
evidence rule. In Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the court of
appeals, using the language for which the case is remembered, said that religious practice
does not achieve the status of an admissible habit both because religiously-motivated
practices are voluntary rather than semi-automatic and because religiously-inspired
behavior does not achieve the degree of "invariable regularity" that is required to make
repetitive behavior a habit. Id. There is reason to think, however, that what troubled the
court of appeals was simply the defendant's attempt to inject his religious beliefs into the
case. The trial court in fact admitted evidence of Levin's habitual religious practices
(specifically, his tendency to observe the Jewish Sabbath and his religious motivations for
doing so). The trial court and the court of appeals seemed to draw the line only when
Levin offered to have a Rabbi testify to the religious reasons for Levin's observance of
the Sabbath.
The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the use of religious belief or its absence to
attack or repair the credibility of a witness. Fed. Rule Evid. 610. But there is no parallel
prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence against the use of religious belief or its
absence to show conduct.
There is now a body of constitutional jurisprudence that purports to place some limits
(principally in the name of the First Amendment) on the use of matters such as political
belief as evidence of conduct. The leading case is Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159
(1992). In Dawson-a capital sentencing proceeding-evidence was offered that the
words "Aryan Brotherhood" were tattooed on the defendant's hand. The Aryan
Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang. Id at 162. But both the defendant and
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people's mental and emotional worlds-offered to show human
behavior-could be easily multiplied.
The principal doctrinal "handle" for the admissibility of
evidence of people's psyches-their mental and emotional states or
"worlds"-is the principle that the use of "motive" to show conduct
does not contravene the character evidence rule because-according
to the standard learning-motive is not character. 3 Sometimes
evidence about the human psyche is admitted under the analogous
principle that the use of matters such as "design" and "plan" and
"intent" to show conduct does not contravene the character evidence
rule-because matters such as "design" and intent are not
"character. '54 But, whether or not matters such as "greed,"
"jealousy," and "hatred" technically-legally speaking-amount to
"character" or "disposition," evidence of such matters does create-
and is intended to create-a picture of the mental and emotional
world, or makeup, of a person.
Recognition of the widespread admissibility of character
evidence under existing law may not make the riddle of the character
evidence rule more tractable. But an awareness of the widespread
admissibility of character evidence does change the thrust of the
riddle. The issue is not whether character evidence should be made
the victim were white. Id. at 166. The Court held that the evidence violated the
defendant's First Amendment rights of free speech and association because it proved no
more than the defendant's "abstract beliefs." Id. at 166-68.
But it now appears that federal constitutional law imposes only very weak constraints
on the courtroom use of matters such as political and religious beliefs. For example. a
post-Dawson Supreme Court decision seems to require only a showing of the relevance of
a defendant's racist beliefs for their use as evidence against a criminal defendant. See
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). In Mitchell, the Court said, "The First
Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Evidence of a person's previous declarations or
statements is commonly admitted in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing
with relevancy, reliability, and the like." Id. at 489. Lower courts have made this point
even more explicit. See Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Dawson
simply requires that the evidence be relevant to an issue at sentencing."). In any event, in
many cases the motivations and beliefs that are introduced as evidence of conduct can
scarcely be described as "political," and vast amounts of evidence about the human
psyche are apparently routinely offered and admitted without any suggestion by any party
that such evidence implicates constitutional doctrines that protect matters such as rights
of association, speech, assembly, and the exercise of religion.
53. See United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
because evidence was introduced to show motive of greed, it did not violate the character
evidence rule); People v. Daniels, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) ("It is
elementary, evidence of motive to commit an offense is evidence of the identity of the
offender.").
54. See United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1572-73 (8th Cir. 1996) (admitting
evidence of prior drug transactions, occurring over a period of years, to show intent and
knowledge).
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admissible. Much character evidence is already admissible. The
issue, in general, is whether the current "straddle" between
admissible and inadmissible character evidence is the right one. This
requires an examination of whether the law has correctly defined
character.
IV. Character as a Bundle of Traits versus Character as the
Animating Spirit or Operating System of the Human Organism
Law is-at least in part-a practical discipline and also-at least
in part-an expression of (relatively) contemporary cultural and
social beliefs and prejudices. It is therefore not surprising that the
law often falls prey to popular but shallow conceptions of
man/woman and his/her relationship to the cosmos. The conception
of character that law makers, courts, and legal commentators have
seemingly embraced in their discussions of the character evidence
rule is a good example of the influence of intellectual fads and
fashions on the law.
American legal discourse about the character evidence rule-
judicial opinions, commentaries of legal scholars, and debates and
discussions of lawmakers and codifiers-uniformly tends to portray
"character" as little more than a fortuitous aggregation-a slapdash
collage-of traits and dispositions. For example, speaking of the
difference between character and methods of proving character,
Wigmore-the dean of all evidence scholars, said, "character ... is
to be considered ... as the actual moral or physical disposition or
sum of traits."" In the same vein, Wigmore equated "character or
disposition" with "a fixed trait or the sum of traits."" Many other
courts and legal scholars have spoken in a similar fashion about
"character."57
55. 1A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 52, at 1148.
56. Id., §55, at 1159.
57. See Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 845, 849 (1982) ("In the simplified
lexicon of evidence law, 'character' may be understood to be a collection of 'traits,' each a
self-contained packet of potential conduct consistent with previously observed reactions
to events, people, or things.") Despite the tone of detached skepticism in this comment,
Professor Uviller does not offer an alternative notion or definition of character. Cf.
Richard Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence,
66 IowA L. REv. 777 (1981). Although Kuhns effectively characterizes current
formulations of the character rule as incoherent, Kuhns himself implicitly thinks-or, at
least, talks-about character in terms of "propensities".
The potpourri conception of human character usually does not appear explicitly in
judicial opinions-partly because judges are less verbose than law teachers-but it does
appear implicitly. See Commonwealth v. John Nagle, 32 N.E. 861, 861 (Mass. 1893)
("Ordinarily the defendant in a criminal case may put in evidence his general good
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Wigmore clearly deserves our respect. He was a man of
monumental intellectual and scholarly accomplishments. But his way
of talking about human character reflects a shallow and inadequate
conception of human character.
The notion that character is an accidental aggregation of attributes
and propensities is nonsense. Human character is not merely a
fortuitous collection of attributes and traits.
What are the historical origins of the notion that character
consists of an adventitious aggregation or fortuitous bundle of
"traits"? How did such a transparently shallow conception of human
character manage to achieve a dominant position in American legal
discourse about the character evidence rule? Although other scholars
have discussed the origins and the history of character evidence
rule,58 I cannot offer an authoritative answer to these questions.
reputation in regard to the elements of character involved in the commission of the crime
charged against him, for the purpose of establishing the improbability of his having done
the wrong imputed to him. A man of good character is unlikely to be guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and reputation is the index of character. This rule has little or
no application to penal acts which have no moral quality, but are merely mala prohibita.
That one is of good reputation as an honest, peaceable citizen has little tendency to show
that he has not violated a statute or ordinance forbidding him to catch trout out of season.
or to drive certain vehicles faster than a walk, or requiring him to keep the sidewalks
abutting on his premises free from snow and ice.").
The conception of character as a collection of traits and dispositions has been
popular in psychology as well as law. See Mendez, supra note 17, at 1051; Miguel A.
Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 1996 EMORY L.J.
221, 226-227. See also Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A
Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504 (1991); David P. Leonard, The Use of
Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1987) (hereinafter Leonard, Rationality and Catharsis); David P.
Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
305, 315-16 (1995) (hereinafter Leonard, Political Process). It is both interesting and
reassuring to note that traditional "trait theory" in psychology-the analogue in
psychology to the conception of character that I criticize here-has gone out of fashion in
psychology, largely because empirical studies apparently failed to confirm the hypothesis
that discrete traits predict behavior. See Mendez, supra, at 227-28. Moreover, some
newer personality theories-theories that move away from traditional "trait theory"-are
apparently not dissimilar to the kind of conception of character for which I argue in this
paper. See generally id. at 226-36 (describing the personality theory of Walter Mischel
and Yuichi Shoda and discussing the implications of the theory for the character evidence
rule).
58. David Leonard seems to trace the origin of the notion of character as a collection
of traits to psychological literature in the early part of the twentieth century, particularly
to Gordon Allport's influential work. See Leonard, Rationality and Catharsis, supra note
57, at 26. But I think it is fair to say that notions analogous to the notion of "traits" were
"in the air" before Allport came on the scene. See supra note 57. For example, viewed
from the vantage of 20th century "trait theory," Book II of David Hume's A TREATISE
OF HUMAN NATURE consists principally of discussions of various character traits and
dispositions (ranging from "pride and humility," "love of fame," "love and hatred," "love
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of relations," to "passions" such as "esteem for the rich and powerful" and "malice and
envy"). See John 0. McGinnis, Law, Human Behavior and Evolution, 8 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 211, 211 n.1 (1997) ("David Hume outlined the way that various human
propensities--'passions' in his words-were responsible for social behavior and social
structure."). Even in the legal arena discussions of conceptions of character in terms of
"traits" and "dispositions" appeared long before Allport's theory appeared. Allport was
born in 1897. The first edition of Wigmore's treatise, which was published in 1904, talks
about "traits" and "dispositions." See, e.g., John Henry Wigmore, 1 A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 52, at 119-121 (1904) (the heading
of this section is "'Character' in Two Senses: Disposition, and Reputation of it"); id. § 55,
at 122 (Wigmore uses the phrase "character or disposition-i.e. a fixed trait or the sum of
traits"). There was talk about "traits of character" before the Supreme Court of the
United States as early as the 1860s. In Thompson v. Bowie, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 463 (1867),
the attorneys for one of the parties argued,
It has been often decided by the courts in civil as well as criminal cases, that
wherever a particular trait of character is involved, or is illustrative of the matter
disputed, there the character of the party in that particular trait may be given in
evidence. Thus, honesty in cases of felony, peaceable disposition, or
quarrelsomeness when drunk, in those of riot, &c., chastity in those of seduction
and criminal conversation, &c., &c. By the admission of such testimony, the
courts recognize the principle contended for, that a man known to act usually in
a certain manner, under certain circumstances, will be presumed to act in the
same manner when shown to be subjected to the same circumstances.
Id. at 467 (footnotes omitted).
There are other references in cases before 1900 to the use of "traits of character" as
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Kenney, 90 F. 257,263 (Del. Cir. Ct. 1898) (charge to
jury: "It does not necessarily follow from the fact that a man has a good reputation for
honesty and integrity that he actually possesses those traits of character. The mere
possession of such a reputation does not render the person possessioning it incapable of
committing a crime involving dishonesty and a want of integrity."); Mercer v. State, 40
Fla. 216, 233-234, 24 So. 154, 159 (1898) ("The general well settled rule of law is, that
when the character of a witness is gone into the only proper object of inquiry is as to his
reputation for truth and veracity. Neither his general character, nor particular phases or
traits of character can be gone into, but the inquiry must be confined to his reputation or
character for truth and veracity."); Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill. 263, 267 (1884) (while
rejecting use of specific instances of honest dealing to bolster veracity of witness, court
uses phrase "traits of character"); Commonwealth v. Nagle, 157 Mass. 554, 554-555, 32
N.E. 861 (1893).
Professor Leonard notes that more recent psychological research and theorizing on
personality has shifted away from Allport's "trait theory." See Leonard, Rationality and
Catharsis, supra note 57; see also Mendez, supra note 57. But see Davies, supra note 57 at
515-17 (arguing that trait theory is not quite as pass6 as Leonard, Mischel, and Mendez
suggest). This shift in personality theory seems compatible with the kind of conception of
human character that I am trying to describe here. The two types of theories-the new
type of personality theory and my theory of human character, while similar in certain
respects, are not the same, and I do not claim that the new type of personality theory that
Professors Davies, Leonard, and Mendez describe offers any direct support for my
account of human character. Needless to say, however, I would be encouraged if scholars
who are better versed in personality theory than I am were to conclude that a sound
personality theory offers some support for the thesis I am advancing in this paper. By the
same token, I am unwilling to assume that the validity of my theory depends on the
validity of the new style of personality theorizing that Leonard and Mendez describe; I
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Nonetheless, I think I am justified in saying that the notion of
character as a bundle of traits has the feel and the smell of nineteenth
century British empiricism.59 The notion that human character
consists of a bundle of traits and dispositions reeks, in particular, of
Dave Hume's philosophy.
From a Humean perspective on (wo)man and the cosmos-that
is, from a standpoint that is nominalist as well as empiricist-human
knowledge consists of perceptions6" or-if one is not too starkly
have independent reasons for believing what I believe about human character. See
further discussion in note 57, supra.
Professor Leonard and I draw rather different conclusions from the (supposed)
demise of "trait theory." He seems to suggest that the empirical studies leading to the
(supposed) demise of trait theory show that character evidence lacks significant probative
value. See Leonard, Rationality and Catharsis, supra note 57, at 26-29. I would suggest
that if trait theory is indeed dead, its demise does not necessarily show that character is
worthless as evidence. The empirical studies that cast doubt on trait theory may instead
only show that a particular theory of human character-trait theory-is invalid. Susan
Marlene Davies carefully makes this distinction in her interesting and important paper on
character evidence. See Davies, supra, at 528-31. Professor Mendez is on exactly the
right track when he implicitly suggests that the possible demise of trait theory and the
emergence of a different and possibly better theory of personality require a
reconsideration of the prohibition against character evidence. See generally Mendez,
supra note 57, (discussing Mischel-Shoda theory) Mendez concludes, however, that even
if the alternative Mischel-Shoda theory is valid, character evidence should probably
remain inadmissible. See id. at 234. It is true that Professor Mendez does occasionally
seem to assume that character = disposition = Allportian traits. See, e.g., id. at 228
("these findings [casting doubt on Allport's trait theory] not only undermine 'common
sense' or intuitive notions of the predictive value of personality traits, but also threaten
the law's assumption about the probative value of character evidence.") In general,
however, Professor Mendez recognizes that it is one thing to say that a particular theory
of personality (human character) is a worthless theory and that it is another thing to say
that personality (human character) is worthless evidence.
59. I am neither asserting nor suggesting that any philosophical movement or
school-be it nineteenth century British empiricism or any other such philosophy or
intellectual movement-is largely or even partially responsible for the prevalence of the
souffld-of-traits conception of human character in American legal discussions of the
character evidence rule. Only a careful and exhaustive analysis of the historical record
would make it justifiable to advance such a claim. Nonetheless, the existence of such a
connection is not intrinsically implausible. It is a fact-a suggestive fact-that some
prominent English and American empiricist philosophers and theorists spoke of
"character" in much the way that leading evidence scholars such as Professor Charles
McCormick and Dean Wigmore did when they talked about character evidence. There is
ample evidence that many leading Evidence scholars such as Wigmore were influenced by
British empiricism-and by Jeremy Bentham in particular. See generally William
Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32 (1990).
60. In my discussion here I do not purport to remain faithful to the details of Hume's
philosophy. I try instead to speak in a general vein about the implications of Hume's
general philosophical position.
61. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE Book 3 Part 1 (1738, Past
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nominalist-it consists of human experiences of sensory events. The
acquisition of knowledge, therefore, involves discerning continuities
and patterns in perceptions or in human experience of sensory
events. A nominalist believes we know only what lies at the surface
of our experience, not what lies underneath them, behind them, or
outside of them. Patterns in perceptions and sensory events are
therefore, as far as we know, "accidental" or "fortuitous." We cannot
say, for example, that because events of type A characteristically or
typically seem to precede events of type B, that instances of A cause
instances of B. We can only say that we have had perceptions or
sensory experiences of instances of B following our perceptions or
sensory experiences of instances of A. This is, roughly speaking, the
Humean view of the cosmos and of man's knowledge of the cosmos.62
From a Humean point of view, the limitations on human
knowledge of the cosmos also apply to human knowledge of the self.
(Human selves are part of the cosmos.) Hence, in observing our
selves (including the selves of other persons) all that we can say (if
we can say anything at all) about human selves is that in our selves
(so to speak) we have observed certain patterns or sequences of
sensory events (or, more precisely stated, certain sequences of
perceptions, sensory experiences, or sensory states).63 Hence, we are
not justified in saying, for example,, that "anger" causes "hitting"
merely because we have seen, in the past, in our selves (or in some
particular sef)'that "hitting" has always or usually followed "anger."
The best that we can say-and, really, all that we can say-is that we
believe, based on our past observations, that there are certain
patterns or tendencies in our selves-in the (states of the) selves that
Masters CD-ROM ed., 1992) ("nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions").
62. Hume thought that perceptions are, so to speak, accidental, or fortuitous, and
that human thought is the result of such fortuitous perceptions. Human thought about the
connections between or among things is therefore legitimate only when and only if human
perceptions have certain patterns. Thus, human thought is, so to speak, inherently
statistical. See, e.g., id. ("It has been observed already, that in no single instance the
ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable either by our senses or reason, and that
we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive
the principle on which their mutual influence depends. It is their constant union alone
with which we are acquainted; and it is from the constant union the necessity arises.")
63. From a strictly empiricist and nominalist point of view, perceptions-or
(subjective) sensory experiences-are all we know. We cannot know what lies behind our
perceptions. We cannot even know that anything stands behind them. Consequently, we
can know ourselves only as beings who have perceptions-or, more starkly, only as a point
in space and time at which a variety of perceptions converge. (Indeed, if we are quite
rigorous in adhering to our empiricist and nominalist premises, we may not even be
justified in saying that we are in fact beings who have or somehow receive perceptions.
For to say that perhaps would be to go behind the perceptions themselves, which cannot
be done.)
Mar. 1998] CHARACTER EVIDENCE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
we have observed.' This nominalist and empiricist way of thinking
about the self is very reminiscent of the way that literature in the law
of evidence describes human character-as a set of dispositions or
traits that people just happen to have.
A Humean account of the self is no more persuasive than is a
Humean account of the cosmos. Like the Humean account of the
cosmos, the Humean account of the self provides no adequate
explanation of our right or ability, on the basis of our past
observations and perceptions, to make judgments or predictions
about the probable state of some event or condition: in a Humean
world we cannot look behind our experiences to make a reasoned or
considered judgment about the probability that a past pattern of
events or behavior will recur. This cognitive deficiency must apply
to human knowledge of the self as well as to human knowledge of the
cosmos. In a Humean world it is not possible to make judgments
about the probable causes of or reasons for the actions of a self; in a
Humean world we can only say that a self has a seeming tendency or
disposition to act in a certain way. Though Hume may have believed
the contrary-Hume is, after all, regarded by many as the
paterfamilias of modern statistical theory, a Humean perspective
offers no basis for making any judgments about the probable states of
unobserved or unknown conditions, whether those unknown
conditions are conditions in the cosmos or whether they are
conditions of human selves. Consequently, Hume's way of thinking
about the world, about (wo)man's knowledge of the world, and about
(wo)man himself (herself) is not coherent.65
64. Indeed, if we are strict nominalists and empiricists, we may be saying too much if
we say that our observations or perceptions lead us to conclude that certain people have
certain dispositions or tendencies. All that we are really justified in saying is that we have
perceived or observed (in the past) certain patterns of human behavior in certain
people-that we have observed or experienced certain patterns in the states of human
selves. We may not be entitled to project those past patterns into the future or into
unknown and unobserved occasions. This, of course, is nothing more than the problem of
"induction" that Hume so notoriously wrestled with. Hume's "solution" of the problem
was no solution at all. Cf. 1A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 37.6, at 1050-1054 n.8 (critique
of analogous frequentist theories of induction). Moreover, if Hume's solution did not
solve the problem of induction about events in the cosmos, his nominalist and empiricist
approach, pro tanto, also did not correctly solve the question of how one makes sound
inferences and judgments about the behavior of human beings. For if sound inference
about the cosmos require some theory about the "hidden" structure of the cosmos, the
same is true of inferences and judgments about the behavior of human beings: they also
require some theory of the structure of human beings, their makeup, and their character.
65. A Humean way of thinking about (wo)man and his (her) world-a way of
thinking that is nominalist as well as empiricist-has considerable difficulty in explaining
the existence of "persons." Hume's (radical) philosophy seems to imply that "persons"
and their "psyches" exist only if, and only to the extent that, there happens to be some
conjunction of events or perceptions-a conjunction that Hume calls "association"-at
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The incoherence of Hume's philosophical perspective was
apparent to some observer's in Hume's own era. Hume's best known
nearly contemporary challenger was Immanuel Kant. Kant, with
Hume in mind, made the argument long ago that the notion of an
entity that we call a "person" is inexplicable unless there is something
more to a person than just the sense data and perceptions that, so to
speak, flow into or through a person.' I cannot pursue the details of
some particular locus in space and time. This view creates any number of difficulties and
puzzles. For example:
(i) Is the existence a person to be equated with the human body?
(ii) Does a person cease to exist when a set of events no longer congregates at a
particular space-time locus?
(iii) But if the answer to question (ii) is "yes," how can the answer to question (i)
also be "yes"?
(iv) Does a person cease to exist when he or she goes to sleep?
(v) Does a person exist after his death-providing and as long as "his" body still
exists?
And so on.
On a Humean view, the thoughts and notions and principles that seem to stream through
the heads and hearts of human beings are nothing more than and nothing other than the
sensations that happen to be associated with each other at a particular point in space and
time. This Humean way of thinking about human beings is not satisfactory. His way of
thinking cannot explain the existence, the workings, or the character of human beings.
It is true that some philosophers still puzzle over the question of what it is that makes
it possible and legitimate to say that some set of space-time events or states constitutes a
"person"; some philosophers still puzzle over the question of what it is that makes it
permissible and legitimate to say that the a person persists as a person (the same person)
over time; and some philosophers still wrestle with the question of why it is permissible
and legitimate to deny that a "new person" comes into existence with each passing
moment of time. See ROBERT NOZIcK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, 27-114 (1981).
However, most of the philosophers who ruminate about such questions probably do not
challenge the presupposition that people do "exist" and "cohere" over time. They seek
primarily to explain that presupposition, which they generally seem to take as "true."
Hume himself said that "the same person may vary his character and disposition, as
well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity" and that it is memory
alone-memory of the "succession of perceptions"-that is "chiefly ... the source of
personal identity." HUME, supra note 61, Book I, Part 4. After saying this, Hume seems
to suggest that "identity" is nothing more than a pleasant fiction that owes its existence to
the desire of the human mind for simplicity: "What I have said concerning the first origin
and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind, may be extended
with little or no variation to that of simplicity. An object, whose different coexistent parts
are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the
same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible, and requires not a much greater
stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we
attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity,
and the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the object." Id.
66. Kant's best-known response to Hume's skeptical challenge had to do with the
possibility of causality in a world of sense-based phenomena. But Kant's rejoinder to
Hume was not directed solely at the problem of the possibility of science and scientific
reasoning; his objective was not solely to rehabilitate science and scientific explanations.
Kant's counterattack was equally directed at Hume's notion that human beings-and
Mar. 1998] CHARACTR EVIDENCE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Kant's argument here. Suffice it to say that Kant saw human beings
as constructive, creative, or constitutive entities who impose an order
on the world that they experience. In Kant's schema human beings in
an important sense consist of the principles by which and through
which they organize and constitute their experiences and perceptions.
This general idea-the idea that the very existence and identity
of a "person" implies that human beings are entities who are
governed by and who constitute certain ordering principles; the idea
that it is the existence of such a set of internal principles governing
human beings that makes it possible to say or think that a person
exists-this general idea is a very old one. The idea is-at the very
least-implicit in Plato's Republic. The same general idea is explicit
in Aristotle's elaboration of his conception of the human animal and
its psyche.
Aristotle discussed the nature of the human psyche most fully in
De Anima.' Although DE ANIMA may be best known for Aristotle's
insistence that the "soul" 68-the human psyche-cannot exist apart
from the body, the most important part of Aristotle's argument for
our purposes is his claim that human beings have "organized" bodies
and that human bodies (and other bodies) are "naturally
organized., 69 A naturally-organized body is a body that has the
ability to organize itself.70 The thesis that human beings (and other
their thinking-are little more or nothing more than an accidental confluence of sense
data or sensory perceptions.
There must be-Kant thought-some thing or matter that makes a "synthetic unity"
out of "apperception." The mere convergence of sense data and perceptions at a
particular space-time locus, Kant thought, does not explain how it is possible that people
or persons "exist." Kant asserted that the unity or identity of a person is possible only if
the unity of the person comes from within, so to speak, rather than from without. Stated
otherwise: it would not be possible to speak of person's having a collection of experiences
or perceptions if one could not talk or think of an entity-a person-who receives and
organizes and orders the experiences that he or she "has." (While it is true that
knowledge of the world does not come solely from within-thinking that would amount to
a solipsism-it is also true that knowledge does not come solely from without.) As is well
known, Kant thought that-insofar as we can tell-it is the person having experiences
who supplies concepts or categories such as space and time, which are matters that make
human experience conceivable, or possible. (These categories for experiencing the world
lead in turn to the concept of causality. Human beings experience the world as a causally-
ordered world.)
For a superb summary of Kant's philosophy see the entry for Immanuel Kant in THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 31. at 398.
67. ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 412a line 29-412b line 6.
68. "Anima" is sometimes translated as "soul." But this is plainly incorrect. "Soul"
has the connotation of a substance separate from matter. And if there was one thing that
Aristotle insisted on, it was that "anima" somehow inheres in matter and does not stand
apart from it nor beside it.
69. See id. at 412a line 29 - 412b line 6.
70. See id. at 412b lines 17-19.
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natural creatures) are self-organizing and self-regulating organisms
was one of Aristotle's greatest contributions to Western thought and
civilization. Aristotle's notion of "organism" has been enormously
influential.7 Furthermore, despite its antiquity, Aristotle's view of
the nature of the "animating principle"'72 of a natural organism
remains important today.
Aristotle's notion of self-organizing organisms has a close
affinity with contemporary cutting-edge research and theorizing
about matters such as human intelligence.' The notion that human
creatures have an internal system of rules, principles, procedures, or
operations that regulates, directs, or organizes their behavior and
activity now has practically the status of a truism in a wide variety of
disciplines.74 It is generally thought that the task of research in fields
such as cognitive science and neuroscience is not to determine
whether or not such an internal operating system exists-whether
some such set of self-organizing or self-animating rules, principles, or
operations does or does not exist-but, rather, to determine the
characteristics and attributes of the principles or operating systems
by which animate organisms such as human beings regulate, control,
and influence their activity.75
71. Aristotle's notion of organism has influenced philosophers as diverse as Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Alfred North Whitehead. See ALFRED NORTH
WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY xi (David R. Griffin
& Donald W. Sherburne eds., corrected ed. 1978). Aristotle's theory of organisms and of
the makeup of the human animal are more than a matter of antiquarian or historical
interest. Some of the modem world's most sophisticated students of matters such as
mind, thought, and intelligence believe that Aristotle's theory of man and his psyche is
essentially right. See PAUL FEYERABEND, PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICISM 12-15 (1981) (vol.
2, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS).
72. The word "anima"-as used by Aristotle-is probably best rendered as the
"animating principle of living things." HENRY VEATCH, ARISTOTLE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPRECIATION 60 (1974).
73. See Hilary Putnam with Martha Nussbaum, Changing Aristotle's Mind, in
HILARY PUTNAM, WORDS AND LIFE 22 (James Conant ed., 1994) [hereinafter WORDS
AND LIFE].
74. See JEAN PIAGET, PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY (Arnold Rosin trans.,
Viking Press, Inc., 1970); THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 31,
at 619 ("The cognitive system of the adult is neither learned, in the Skinnerian sense, nor
generically preprogrammed. Rather, it results from the organization of specific
interactions whose character is shaped both by the features of the objects interacted with
... and by the current cognitive system of the child .... ).
75. It is true that until fairly recently-until, roughly, the 1970s-some prominent
theorists peremptorily dismissed the idea of anything remotely akin to a "psyche" or
"soul" as metaphysical nonsense. If one were to use pseudo-Marxist language, one might
say that such theorists dismissed terms such as "psyche" on the ground that the use of
such language amounts to the "reification" of non-existent mental states. B.F. Skinner,
the father of modern behavioral psychology, is probably the most renowned example of
this "hard-headed," materialist, "anti-metaphysical" attitude. See B.F. SKINNER,
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The idea that organisms "exist" and that they have the capacity
to regulate or direct their behavior has little or nothing to do with the
SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 283-294 (1953). Skinner asserts that "a self is simply a
device for representing a functionally unified system of responses." Id. at 285. Skinner
seemed to deny even the existence of "ideas." See id. at 252-254. Skinner referred to
thinking as "the behavior of making a decision." Id. at 242.
Some of the logical positivists may have shared some of Skinner's views-though this
is far from clear. For example, Rudolf Carnap, the "founder" of the school of thought
sometimes called "logical behaviorism," occasionally seemed to deny the reality or
existence of psychic or mental states. See generally RUDOLF CARNAP, DER LOGISCHE
AUFBAU DER WELT (1928). See also RUDOLF CARNAP, The Development of My
Thinking, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP 3, 16-19 (Paul Schlipp ed., 1963)
(volume IX of The Library of Living Philosophers series). See also RUDOLF CARNAP,
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD & PSEUDOPROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY 323,
339 (Rolf A. George trans., 1967); Rudolf Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, in
LOGICAL POSITIVISM 165 (A.J. Ayer, ed., 1959). But I think it is important to add that it
is easy to misinterpret the logical positivists: I think their theories are often caricatured.
My own recent re-reading of Carnap and some other logical positivists makes me think
that it is a fundamental error to suppose that Carnap or any of the other logical positivists
of his generation ever said or thought that "non-observables" are "illusions." What they
generally did insist on was that theories and theoretical statements be empirically
testable, which is not the same thing as saying that unobservable events do not "exist" or
that statements about unobservable matters are "false" or "useless." Carnap did not
believe that all "unobservable" nomological or law-like statements were useless illusions.
In any event, Carnap himself denied that he ever intended to deny the reality of things
such as mental states or law-like statements. See Rudolf Carnap, Intellectual
Autobiography, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP 3, 18-19 (Paul Schlipp ed..
1963) (volume IX of The Library of Living Philosophers series).
There are some important theorists who even now seem to be carrying on a Skinner-
like campaign against the "reification" of supposedly unreal mental states or entities. See
PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT OF THE SOUL: A
PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 187-226 (1995). But the location of the
battlefield seems to have shifted. For example, despite his persistent efforts to deny the
reality of "mental states," Churchland emphasizes that the human animal is a self-
organizing entity. Moreover, "behaviorist" and "physicalist" theories such as those of
B.F. Skinner now strike many informed observers as either dogmatic or naive. The
change in attitude is perhaps best exemplified by Hilary Putnam. Putnam is a prominent
contemporary theorist who openly acknowledges the shift in his own thinking about the
question of the reality or unreality of matters such as mental states. See Hilary Putnam,
WORDS AND LIFE, supra note 73, at 428 (James Conant ed., 1994) ("A doctrine to which
most philosophers of science subscribe (and to which I subscribed for many years) is the
doctrine that the laws of such 'higher-level' sciences as psychology and sociology are
reducible to the laws of lower-level sciences-biology, chemistry-ultimately to the laws
of elementary particle physics. Acceptance of this doctrine is generally identified with
belief in 'The Unity of Science' (with capitals), and rejection of it with belief in vitalism.
or psychism, or, anyway, something bad. In this paper I want to argue that this doctrine is
wrong.") The shift in intellectual perspectives has been most striking in the field of
psychology: cognitive psychology is now considered to be at the cutting edge and
behaviorism is a pale shadow of its former self. Much of the work done in the field of
cognitive science would be altogether incoherent and insensible if it were true that
"logical operations" do not really "exist" or do not "operate" somewhere or somehow
within the human organism.
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notion of a disembodied soul, an entity that is viewed as being
somehow separate from "matter," "material," or something of the
sort. Aristotle thought of "soul" or "psyche" as a kind of quality or
attribute of the things that we call organisms. The Aristotelian view
that the human psyche consists of a kind of indwelling logic or reason
may have seemed "quaint" for a time. But if that was ever the case, it
is no longer so. Today-in the day and age of the computer-
theorists routinely assert or assume that it is not possible to describe
the human organism without describing its internal structure-
including-or especially including-the logic of its internal parts and
workings and operations.76
Today it is common to hear it said that it is impossible to
understand the workings of the brain simply by grasping the physical
material out of which the brain is made; one must instead understand
the functional architecture of the brain-how the arrangement and
relationship of the various material parts of the brain serve to make
or allow the brain to perform certain operations or follow certain
orderly and ordered procedures or logical patterns.7 Although the
claims and hopes of some of the early proponents of "artificial
intelligence" were inflated, it is not entirely illegitimate to analogize
human character to a computer's "operating system." How a
computer-and a person-acts or behaves depends, of course, in part
on the material ingredients-nuts, bolts, hands, eyes, teeth, wires, and
so on-of which that computer or person is composed. But neither
the behavior of a computer nor the behavior of a person can be
described solely by describing that computer's or person's material or
physical "parts." Moreover, it would be ludicrous to try to describe
the behavior of a computer by attempting to describe its
"propensities," "inclinations," or "tendencies." The only truly
informative description of the behavior of a computer is one that
describes the logic by which the computer operates-the description
that captures the computer's "operating system." The same is almost
certainly true of descriptions of the behavior of people.
The only reason that a description of a person's dispositions or
tendencies ever works-the only reason that such a description ever
"says" anything about a person's likely behavior-is that either the
76. See ZENON W. PYLYSHYN, COMPUTATION AND COGNITION: TOWARD A
FOUNDATION FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1-21 (1984).
77. John Haugeland refers to this notion as the idea of "medium independence."
HAUGELAND, supra note 2, at 58. He says, "Formal systems [of which the mind may be
an instance] are independent of the medium in which they are 'embodied.' In other words,
essentially the same formal system can be materialized in any number of different media,
with no formally significant difference whatsoever. This is an important feature of formal
systems in general; I call it medium independence." Id (emphasis in original).
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person providing the description or the person receiving it implicitly
provides or infers the rules and operations that "cause" the described
disposition or tendency. There must be some rule or principle or set
of rules or principles that "generates" the disposition. Otherwise
there is no basis for making judgments about when-under what
circumstances-the disposition in question might swing into action.78
A disposition or pattern of behavior is often (though not always) a
reflection or expression of a set of internal principles and
operations. 9
In the course of this discussion of the nature of human character
I have mentioned Aristotle and other "worthies." I do not invoke
such worthies in order to "prove" that human beings are self-
organizing beings who have an internal structure or logic that
influences and directs their behavior. I mention such eminent
philosophers, theorists, and scientists principally to give solace and
reassurance to any people who may wonder if they should trust their
own intuitions and common sense judgments about human character.
Our intuitions and common sense tell us that there is within each one
of us some set of principles and operations-some kind of a structure
or "logic"-that influences how we behave.8" There is no good
78. My argument implies that prior dissimilar conduct can, in principle, be as
probative as prior similar conduct. The only important question is whether the prior
conduct reveals something about a person's character that sheds light on the probability
that the person might do a particular act. Thus, on my line of reasoning, to show that a
defendant probably killed a priest, it might well be appropriate to show that the
defendant destroyed the priest's garden or ripped up religious vestments of that cleric's
religion.
79. By suggesting that conscious thought influences action I am making a claim that
is inconsistent with the views of some students of "cognitive science." Some cognitive
scientists assert that the thoughts and impressions available to us in our own examination
of our selves are really apparitions and that only a deeper set of principles, not available
through introspection, is the only thing that "actually" guides and directs the activity of
the human organism. Paul Churchland, for example, seems to take such a view. He
seems to believe that consciousness is an epiphenomenon and that the functional rules
governing human behavior are precisely like the codes that underlie the "behavior" of
some (as yet uninvented) computers. See PAUL CHURCHLAND.
ANEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 55 (1989). ("[T]here is no problem at all in conceiving the
eventual reduction of mental states and properties to neurophysiological states and
properties.") Even Churchland, however, seems to think that in the interim-while we are
awaiting the denouement that computational science promises-we can and should rely
on "folk" rules about the sources and causes of human behavior-sources and causes that
folk wisdom asserts includes "conscious mental states." Id. at 1-2. ("We understand
others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit command of an integrated body of lore
concerning the lawlike relations holding among external circumstances, internal states,
and overt behavior.").
80. Cf Peter Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U. L. REV. 883, 916 (1986)
("The occasional value of constructs such as humor or wit cannot seriously be doubted. If
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reason for anyone to doubt the soundness of such intuitions.
In April of 1997 the New York Times carried a report by Linda
Greenhouse81 that illustrates the relevance of an individual's inner
logic to behavior. The report discussed oral arguments before the
Supreme Court in Bracy v. Gramley.2 The case involved a Chicago
judge-Thomas Maloney-who took bribes from defendants in
murder cases.83 Judge Maloney presided at William Bracy's murder
trial, but Bracy did not have the imagination or the guile to offer
Judge Maloney a bribe." Whether coincidentally or not, Bracy was
convicted and sentenced to death." After Judge Maloney's
defalcations became known-Maloney was eventually convicted of
taking bribes-Bracy sought to overturn his conviction. The case
eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether Bracy had the right to conduct discovery
for the purpose of trying to show that he had been denied the right to
a fair trial before an impartial judge.86
Bracy argued "the trial was fundamentally unfair because there
was a substantial possibility that Judge Maloney was unduly harsh in
the non-bribe cases to deflect attention from his leniency in the
others. '87 "Justice Scalia," however, "said he thought it just as likely
that rather than punishing those who did not pay bribes, a judge
taking bribes to favor some defendants would be lenient in other
cases as well to avoid calling attention to his behavior."88
Greenhouse quoted Scalia as saying, "[Maloney] would look worse if
one understands how the witty mind of a particular person works, it is often possible to
make some very good guesses about a person's behavior. Indeed, if one has no sense of a
person's pattern of mental activity, one almost surely misses the person's jokes."). See
also id, at 927-32 (discussing, inter alia, how an understanding of Ronald Reagan's mind
and his sentiments and the like might improve inferences about Reagan's probable
actions toward Nicaragua during his Presidency) ("Note that Reagan's logic, no matter
how fuzzy, does not consist of mere dispositions and tendencies .... While it may be true
that there are some instances where people simply have certain dispositions, it is also true
that in most instances what we refer to as a disposition or propensity is a product of a
belief system . . . . The difficulty involved in talking about human dispositions and
proclivities is akin to the difficulty of explaining and predicting natural phenomena by
talking about relative frequencies. Observed relative frequencies in both the human and
natural context convey significant information only to the extent that an observer has
some sense of the logical scaffolding on which such frequencies are constructed.").
81. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider How the Taint of a Corrupt Judge Should
Be Measured and Remedied, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1997, at A18.
82. 117 S.Ct. 1793 (1997)




87. Greenhouse, supra note 81, at A18.
88. Id.
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he were a hanging judge in most cases and a bleeding heart in
some."
8 9
The contrasting views of Bracy and Scalia about how Judge
Maloney might have reasoned about his treatment of defendants who
failed to pay bribes illustrate my thesis about the relevance and
probative force of the "internal operating systems" of human beings
on their conduct on particular occasions. Bracy and Scalia disagreed
about how Judge Maloney probably thought and felt about the risk of
detection. But Bracy and Scalia both implicitly agreed that Judge
Maloney's thoughts and feelings about the risk of detection must
have influenced Maloney's treatment of defendants who did not pay
bribes. Bracy's reading of Judge Maloney's "internal operating
system" supported one hypothesis about Maloney's probable
treatment of Bracy while Scalia's musings about Maloney's thoughts
and feelings supported a rather different hypothesis about Maloney's
behavior at Bracy's trial. But Bracy and Scalia both assumed that the
nature of Maloney's thinking was pertinent to the question of how
Maloney acted at Bracy's trial.90 They were entirely right.
Conclusion: Unresolved Issues
I have argued that the current character evidence rule is an
unstable halfway house between (i) a legal regime that altogether
prohibits the use of character to show the doing of an act and (ii) a
system of proof rules that operates on the premise that a person's
mental and emotional makeup is a powerful indicator of behavior
which the law cannot afford to abandon. Nonetheless, it is premature
to assert that the law should now abandon the remnants of the
prohibition against the use of human character to show conduct. It is
true, I think, that the prohibition against circumstantial character
evidence is more fiction than fact. It is also true, I think, that the
character evidence rule, as porous as it already is, is gradually
89. Id.
90. Justice Scalia's comments during oral argument about how Judge Maloney might
have reasoned were intended to question Bracy's argument that he should be permitted
to gather evidence about Judge Maloney's "motivations." On my premises, however,
Bracy has the better argument. No abstract model of deliberation, reasoning, or cognitive
processes can show how a particular person-Judge Maloney-thought and felt about a
matter such as the risk of detection. People, judges, and, even corrupt judges can be and
often are quite different; they can have and often do have very different inner worlds or
internal operating systems. Hence, if we wish to guess, or infer, how a particular
individual or judge thought and felt, it is plainly helpful to gather and analyze evidence
bearing on that individual's inner world. The Court did in fact eventually rule-
unanimously-that Bracy did have a right to conduct discovery in an effort to substantiate
his hypothesis about Judge Maloney's treatment of criminal defendants who failed to pay
bribes. See Bracy, 117 S. Ct. 1793.
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becoming yet more porous. It is even possible that the character
evidence rule is headed towards oblivion. Nonetheless, I am not yet
sure that oblivion is where I want the character evidence rule to go.
This is only partly because I recognize the justice in the observation
that the incoherence of the character evidence rule is an insufficient
justification for abolishing the rule. We need to pause before
performing radical surgery on the remnants of the character evidence
rule because the use of character evidence presents risks that have
not yet been adequately studied. I think that the standard
justifications for a prohibition against circumstantial character
evidence are unconvincing. Nonetheless, the use of character
evidence may be dangerous or unwise for other reasons.
If it is true that human character is the animating spirit or
operating system of a human organism, there are two or three
features of human character that suggest that the use of character
evidence in adjudication is problematic. The first is the complexity of
the internal system of rules and principles that regulate human
conduct. The second is the deep and tacit nature of many of the
internal principles and operations that regulate the behavior of
human beings.
The complexity of the human operating system raises some
obvious questions. The first question is whether the complexity of
human character generally or necessarily renders partial or
fragmentary information about human character entirely or largely
worthless.91 The second question is whether the amount of
evidentiary detail that is necessary to do justice to the complexity of
human character is so great that it is unaffordable.
The tacit nature of much human character and the tacit nature of
much knowledge of human character present an additional array of
issues. 2 The first question is whether it is possible, in the courtroom,
to generate the kind of tacit (but genuine) knowledge of character
91. Although it may be correct to say that it is necessary to have a lot of character
evidence to understand character well, it does not follow that a little evidence of
character is always worthless or (worse yet) always worse than no character evidence at
all. An ordinary trier of fact is astute enough to realize that fragmentary evidence may
have to be discounted. It is possible, moreover, that even fragmentary information about
character can provide an observer with a clue about the (complex) makeup of a person.
It should not be forgotten that we can and do use background or default assumptions
when we have few details. For example, in the absence of further details, and knowing
only that the defendant previously raped a little girl, we are perhaps entitled to guess that
this child abuser thinks and feels the way that we believe most other child abusers think
and feel.
92. Much human knowledge in general is tacit. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT
DIMENSION (1966). It seems clear that much knowledge of character is also tacit or
implicit rather than explicit.
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that people sometimes attain as a result of their ordinary interactions
with people such as family members and friends. My view is that this
is almost certainly not possible.93
If I am right about the improbability of significant tacit learning
by the trier of fact about the character of witnesses and parties on the
basis of the trier's observations of the courtroom behavior of
witnesses and parties, the next question is whether it is possible, in
principle, for a trier of fact to acquire meaningful information about
an internal operating system whose operations are so tacit and deep
that the person in whom that operating system resides may himself
not have a very good understanding of its nature.94 Can reliable or
useful character evidence be generated in a formal judicial setting
such as a trial in which parties, witnesses, and triers do not act or
interact "naturally"?
It is possible that the answer to this second set of questions is
"yes." In particular, it is possible that the trier of fact can acquire
significant knowledge about the character of witnesses and parties
the way a biographer does-by acquiring and studying large
collections of details about the people whose character and behavior
are in question. Suppose that this is so. The tacit, or submerged,
nature of human character may then join forces with the complexity
of human character to present a third riddle about the value of
character evidence.
Is it possible that our system of litigation and proof is so
contentious and so coarse, and the human internal operating system
so complex and submerged, that it is just not possible for our system
of litigation and proof to produce reliable verdicts about a matter so
subtle and complex as human character?95 The American system of
93. The courtroom is generally a singularly inappropriate venue for the acquisition
of tacit knowledge of human character. Participants in the American system of litigation
and adjudication-I have in mind participants such as witnesses and parties-are taught
to act in highly stylized ways, which makes it difficult for triers of fact to use informal
behavioral cues to acquire reliable information about the internal operating systems of
such courtroom participants. A courtroom setting is an "artificial" setting and, thus, even
if the person whose behavior is to be assessed is in the courtroom, the behavior of that
person will be artificial and it probably will therefore not convey any useful information
about that person's character to the trier or triers of fact.
94. The argument that the attainment of such knowledge in the courtroom is in
principle impossible might begin with the premise that practically all good knowledge of
human character is acquired primarily as a result of interactions between the observer
and the actor or as a result of the observer's direct observation of the actor's behavior (an
actor such as a child or a friend). In this process it is possible that neither the actor nor
the observer can explicitly describe what either of them believes the actor's character to
be. If so, it is arguable that it is not feasible to make accurate determinations in a
courtroom setting about the character of any person.
95. The problem I am trying to pose is acute. I am assuming that "deep character"-
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litigation and proof is both contentious and adversarial. One astute
scholar felicitously refers to this system as a "super-adversary
system."96 Is it possible and probable that large amounts of character
evidence-such as detailed life histories-are peculiarly and
excessively susceptible to manipulation and distortion in an adversary
and contentious system of litigation and proof such as ours? In short,
is it the case that large amounts of character evidence-detailed
personal histories, for example-are peculiarly susceptible to
manipulation and that in our adversary and contentious system of
proof otherwise nuanced evidence of human character-evidence,
that is, of the complex internal operating system that we call human
character-would surely be corrupted and degraded and that the
necessary nuances about character would be obliterated in the heat
of courtroom warfare?' This is a question that requires further study
and investigation.
There is one last major question that the tacit nature of human
character and the complexity of character suggest. It bears repeating
that human character is elusive as well as complex. That is in part
because character is deep within each one of us; that is, there are
many components of character that are hidden from the immediate
view of strangers and even of ourselves. This suggests a question of
the utmost importance: Is it the case that meaningful-that is,
if we can grasp it-is very probative of behavior. But I am also suggesting that our
contentious system of litigation may be incapable of generating accurate assessments of
the internal operating systems-the internal "logic"-of human beings.
96. Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An
Adversary Oriented Approach 49 HASTINGS L.J. -(1997).
97. The question in the text presents the related question of whether detailed
evidence of character is any more subject to distortion and manipulation than any other
kind of evidence. Many students of evidence and inference believe that all rational
judgments about evidence are in some sense "subjective" or "personal." See Glenn
Shafer, The Construction of Probability Arguments, 66 B.U. L. REV. 799 (1986).
Nonetheless, some legal scholars have drawn a distinction between hard facts and soft
facts. For example, Mirjan Damagka once suggested a distinction between "external
facts" (such as the speed of a car) and "internal facts" (such as knowledge) and he
suggested that methods of proof for the two types of facts might also differ. See Mirjan
Dama~ka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083,
1085 (1975). See also 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 1 n. 1, at 3-6 (reviser's
extended discussion of the question of a possible difference between different kinds of
factual questions and a possible difference in the degree of their hardness or objective
ascertainability). If one takes the position that conclusions about human character are
"soft facts" rather than a "hard facts," the thesis that character evidence is particularly
dangerous because it is particularly vulnerable to manipulation and distortion may seem
to gather some force. But the argument that questions about human character are soft
may prove too much. For if questions about character are soft, so are questions about
matters such as intent and knowledge. Yet the law routinely allows and requires the
submission of evidence about issues such as intent and knowledge.
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detailed-evidence of character must peer so deeply into the human
heart and soul, into the inner recesses of the mind and soul, that such
evidence ought to be regarded as so demeaning and degrading that
such evidence ought to be prohibited for that reason alone? There
are obvious differences between the nightmarish sort of inquisition
portrayed in Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon98 and the sort of
"inquisition" that would occur if parties in American trials were
allowed to submit detailed life histories of witnesses, parties, and
other actors. Nonetheless, serious attention needs to be given to the
possibility that the mere use in litigation of some kinds of character
evidence might so expose the inner recesses of people's hearts and
souls to public view that the use of such evidence should be
prohibited-perhaps by the "character evidence rule."'
98. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy trans., 1941).
99. Evidence scholars need to devote much more thought than they have to the
possibility of a connection between the character evidence and the "policy" of preventing
unnecessary human degradation. They should consider the possibility that the character
evidence rule impedes or should impede the use of evidence about the inner recesses of
the human soul. They need to pay some attention to the possibility that the mere use of
evidence such as detailed life histories degrades the dignity of the person whose inner
recesses are exposed. They need to consider the possibility, for example, that the
degradation that Rubashov suffered in Koestler's DARKNESS AT NOON, supra note 98,
was attributable, not primarily to the physical punishment and correction that Rubashov
suffered at the hands of his inquisitor, but principally to the fact that Rubashov's deepest
feelings, fears, and beliefs became known to an official inquisitor.
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